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EQUAL PROTECTION DESIGN DEFECTS 
Jonathan P. Feingold* 
ABSTRACT 
One can understand constitutional doctrine as a tool designed to effectuate 
the Constitution and its various provisions. Equal protection doctrine, in turn, 
comprises a set of Justice-made rules designed to realize the promise of equal 
protection under the law. The substance of that promise remains a topic of deep 
contestation. Nonetheless, more than forty years of constitutional jurisprudence 
have entrenched a vision of constitutional equality that privileges what I refer to 
herein as the “right to compete.” Simply put, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
embraced the view that the Equal Protection Clause mandates the government to 
allocate public benefits—such as employment and admissions—on the basis of a 
person’s individual “merit,” irrespective of their race. 
Scholars have long critiqued the individualistic and colorblind principles on 
which this vision rests. Less scholarship, in contrast, has explored whether the 
doctrine actually gives the Supreme Court what it says it wants. One might assume 
that it does. Yet growing empirical evidence from domains spanning employment, 
law enforcement, and education suggests quite the opposite. Specifically, findings 
from the mind sciences reveal that common facially neutral evaluative tools—such 
as human judgment, predictive algorithms, and standardized tests—can 
systematically mismeasure the existing talent and potential (that is, merit) of 
individuals from negatively stereotyped racial groups. Facially neutral measures of 
merit, it turns out, may often compromise the right to compete. Equal protection 
doctrine, which renders facially neutral state action presumptively constitutional, 
accordingly incentivizes conduct that exacts the precise harm that, according to the 
Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to prevent. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................514
I. EQUAL PROTECTION DESIGN .........................................................................517
A. The Basics: A Preference for Facial Neutrality ....................................517
B. Why Facial Neutrality? To Promote the “Right To Compete” ..........518
C. Related Concerns: Social Cohesion and Racial Stigma ......................525
II. RACIAL MISMEASURES: WHEN FACIAL NEUTRALITY FAILS ....................528
 
* Research Fellow, BruinX | Special Assistant to the Vice Chancellor, UCLA Equity, Diversity and 
Inclusion. Jonathan Feingold holds a B.A. from Vassar College and a J.D. from UCLA School of Law. 
Many thanks for insightful comments, inspiration, and feedback from the UCLA School of Law 
Advanced Critical Race Theory Workshop, Devon Carbado, Anna Faircloth, Jerry Kang, David 
Simson, and Noah Zatz. I would also like to thank the editors of the Temple Law Review for their 
thoughtful feedback throughout the editing process. 
514 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
A. Shifting Standards ....................................................................................531
B. Uneven Conditions ..................................................................................535
C. Predictive Algorithms ..............................................................................539
D. Neither Intentional Disparate Treatment nor Disparate Impact ........540
III. THE CASE FOR REDESIGNING DOCTRINE ....................................................543
A. Reimagined Doctrine: The Case Studies ...............................................545
1. Reimagining Washington v. Davis ..................................................546
2. Reimagining Gratz v. Bollinger ......................................................548
B. Engaging Predictable Objections...........................................................550
1. Judicial Incompetence......................................................................550




In the mid-2000s, self-described “behavioral realist[s]”1 cohered around the 
observation that decades of values-based arguments—often mobilizing anticaste 
or antisubordination visions of constitutional equality—had failed to soften the 
Supreme Court’s hostility toward affirmative action.2 The behavioral realists, in 
turn, shifted the debate from values to facts. Instead of contesting the normative 
commitments that informed the doctrine, behavioral realists mobilized social 
science to disrupt empirical assumptions embedded in the law.3 
Little more than a decade later, the results are mixed. On the one hand, the 
science of implicit bias—central to the behavioral realist canon—is well traveled 
across legal and lay discourse.4 Yet even as the science proliferates and the legal 
scholarship evolves, little suggests that these new facts will motivate doctrinal 
 
 1. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 n.21 (2005). 
 2. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006). Behavioral realists built upon existing 
scholarship that challenged empirical assumptions laden in constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Barbara J. 
Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory 
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (mobilizing social science literature on “unconscious 
discrimination” to critique the discriminatory intent rule); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing 
“unconscious racism”); cf. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999) (describing how emerging 
cognitive biases and heuristics scholarship was “slow in reaching the academic literature”). 
 3. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1064 (critiquing standard conceptions of discrimination 
by mobilizing research on implicit social cognitions that “examines those mental processes that 
operate without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless influence fundamental 
evaluations of individuals and groups”). 
 4. See Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit Bias To Advance 
Anti-Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 7–9 (2015) (surveying discussions of implicit 
bias within legal scholarship). 
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reform.5 If anything, the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence 
appears as entrenched as ever—a reality unlikely to change following the 
appointment of Justice Kavanaugh.6 
Given the Supreme Court’s apparent intractability, one might cast 
behavioral realism as a bust. It was, after all, intended to spur doctrinal reform 
where values-based arguments fell short.7 Such a diagnosis is premature for what 
remains a nascent legal school of thought. More importantly, evaluating 
behavioral realism based on doctrinal reform alone overlooks its value as a 
model of scholarly engagement. Specifically, by disrupting empirical assumptions 
instead of critiquing normative commitments, behavioral realism offers a vehicle 
to assess whether activists, scholars, and judges—including Supreme Court 
Justices—care about what they say they care about. 
This Article adopts a behavioral realist approach to interrogate the 
Supreme Court’s long-stated commitment to individual meritocracy in the equal 
protection context. This commitment can be seen as responsible, at least in part, 
for the rise of an equal protection doctrine designed to protect what I refer to 
herein as every person’s “right to compete.”8 As I explain in greater detail 
below, the right to compete reflects a vision of constitutional equality that 
requires the government to allocate public goods—such as employment or 
admission—on the basis of a person’s individual “merit,” irrespective of her 
race.9 
Equal protection doctrine, in turn, can be understood as Justice-made rules 
designed to promote, among other ends, the right to compete. A central feature 
of contemporary equal protection doctrine is its disparate treatment of facially 
neutral state action and racial classifications. Facially neutral state action is 
 
 5. I refer specifically to behavioral realism’s impact on the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. Certain state courts and lower federal courts have shown an interest in aligning the law 
with the science. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 580–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“Other recent psychological research has shown that unconscious racial bias continues to play an 
objectively measurable role in many people’s decision processes.”); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 
N.E.3d 767, 782 n.4 (Mass. 2018) (Budd, J., concurring) (citing behavioral realist scholarship for the 
proposition that “even people who do not believe themselves to harbor implicit bias may in fact act in 
ways that disfavor people of color”). 
 6. During his confirmation hearings, Justice Kavanaugh appeared to suggest a preference for 
colorblind selection criteria. See Scott Jaschik, Kavanaugh Evades Questions on Affirmative Action, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 14, 2018), http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/09/14/kavanaugh-
evades-questions-affirmative-action [http://perma.cc/7E94-6LN3]. 
 7. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1066 (“[W]e contend that a presentist framing that 
exposes and responds to pervasive implicit bias—even in those who genuinely believe themselves to be 
bias-free—provides an independent and compelling case for action.”). 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. Individual meritocracy is not the only normative commitment that underlies the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. See infra Part I.C. Nonetheless, it has been, and remains, a 
central and critical normative pillar employed by the Court to justify prevailing doctrinal 
arrangements. See infra Part I.B. 
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subject to rational basis review and rarely struck down.10 Racial classifications, in 
contrast, must satisfy strict judicial scrutiny and rarely survive.11 
Scholars have long critiqued the principles that animate what I have termed 
the equal protection right to compete.12 Less attention, however, has been paid 
to whether existing doctrine actually promotes this vision of equality. One might 
presume that it does. Yet empirical findings spanning employment, law 
enforcement, and education suggest the opposite.13 Specifically, scholarship from 
the mind sciences reveals that common facially neutral evaluative tools—such as 
human judgment, standardized tests, and predictive algorithms—can 
systematically mismeasure an individual’s existing talent and potential (that is, 
merit) because of her race.14 Accordingly, when decisionmakers rely on such 
“racial mismeasures”15 to determine whom to hire or admit, they effectively 
compromise each candidate’s right to an individualized, meritocratic, and 
race-free review. 
In short, facially neutral measures of merit may, counterintuitively, 
jeopardize the right to compete, even as contemporary equal protection doctrine 
renders the use of such metrics presumptively constitutional.16 This, in turn, 
incentivizes the government to employ practices that produce the precise harm 
that a majority of Justices say the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
prevent. The doctrine, it appears, may not be giving the Supreme Court what it 
says it wants. 
 
 10. See Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1832 (2012) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has concluded that “facially race-neutral laws merit almost complete 
constitutional deference”). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135–36 (1997) (describing a modern equal 
protection “culture that now embraces ‘equal opportunity’ and ‘nondiscrimination’”). 
 13. See infra Section II for a discussion of racial mismeasures. See, e.g., infra note 126 for 
scholarship finding that facially neutral evaluations often produce racial mismeasures. 
 14. I refer specifically to research on stereotype threat and implicit bias. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
Stereotype threat refers to the psychological threat that arises when a person fears that poor 
performance on a task will confirm a negative stereotype about her group. See Sam Erman & Gregory 
M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative Steps To Promote Meritocracy 
and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 312 (2015) (discussing stereotype threat); 
Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 619–622 (1997) [hereinafter Steele, A Threat in the Air] (discussing early 
stereotype threat studies). Relative to implicit bias, stereotype threat remains under-mined within 
legal scholarship. Two April 13, 2019, Westlaw searches reveal the disparate attention received by 
implicit bias and stereotype threat in legal scholarship. The searches identified 3,012 articles that 
included “implicit bias” yet only 631 that mentioned “stereotype threat.” 
 15. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text for an explanation of the term “racial 
mismeasures.” 
 16. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (holding that all racial 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979) 
(requiring plaintiffs to establish discriminatory purpose in the context of facially race-neutral state 
action that has a racially disparate impact). 
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This Article proceeds in three sections. In Section I, to lay groundwork, I 
explore how a commitment to the right to compete emerged over more than four 
decades of Supreme Court equal protection case law. I also tie this commitment 
to the Supreme Court’s disparate treatment of facially neutral state action and 
racial classifications. In Section II, I draw on social science to introduce and 
unpack the concept of a racial mismeasure. This review of the social science 
exposes that, contrary to commonsense assumptions, selection processes that 
unmindfully rely on facially neutral measures of merit will often deny certain 
competitors, because of their race, the right to compete. In Section III, I advance 
the argument that contemporary equal protection doctrine is ill suited to 
promote the right to compete. To further this line of engagement, I imagine how 
doctrinal reform would have impacted seminal equal protection decisions. 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION DESIGN 
A. The Basics: A Preference for Facial Neutrality 
Contemporary equal protection doctrine is, at least on the surface, 
straightforward.17 Racial classifications—whether invidious or benign—are 
presumptively unconstitutional and trigger strict judicial scrutiny.18 Facially 
neutral state action, absent discriminatory intent, is presumptively constitutional 
and triggers rational basis review.19 This disparate treatment of facially neutral 
state action and racial classifications has been met with considerable critique.20 
 
 17. Although beyond the scope of this Article, when one pushes a little, equal protection 
doctrine begins to crack. For instance, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s rhetoric, strict scrutiny 
does not apply to all state action adopted because of its racial impact. See Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“School boards 
may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other 
means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; 
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other 
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on 
a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them 
would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.”). Moreover, strict scrutiny does not apply to 
suspect descriptions or the Census even though both could be construed as racial classifications. See 
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (holding that a Census calculation method that 
undercounted certain identifiable minority groups was not subject to strict scrutiny); Brown v. City of 
Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that law enforcement’s reliance on a description of 
a criminal suspect’s race or gender does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Stephen Menendian, 
What Constitutes A “Racial Classification”?: Equal Protection Doctrine Scrutinized, 24 TEMP. POL. & 
C.R. L. REV. 81, 96 (2014) (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent use of the term “racial 
classification”). 
 18. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226; City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 
(1989). 
 19. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“[W]e have not held that a law, 
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than 
of another.”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (“[‘Discriminatory purpose’] implies that the 
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Much of this past critique is warranted, particularly given how 
contemporary equal protection doctrine has rendered the Fourteenth 
Amendment more hostile to race-conscious remedies designed to promote 
integration and racial equality than to facially neutral state action that 
perpetuates the United States’ legacy of segregation and racial inequality. 
Nonetheless, my aim is different. Rather than critique the vision of constitutional 
equality on which existing doctrine rests, I am interested in evaluating whether 
doctrine actually serves its stated purpose. To begin this analysis, I turn first to 
that purpose, which I term the right to compete. 
B. Why Facial Neutrality? To Promote the “Right To Compete” 
As I describe in greater detail below, the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence coheres around a stated commitment to protect every person’s 
right to compete for public goods on the basis of individual merit, irrespective of 
their race.21 In this Article, I refer to this principle as the right to compete.22 This 
principle emerged within the Supreme Court’s adjudication of facially neutral 
state action and racial classifications. 
 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”). 
 20. See Mario L. Barnes, “The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 2096 (2016) (describing works that 
critique the Supreme Court’s deference to facially neutral state action and its hostility toward racial 
classifications that promote minority rights). 
 21. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52, 319–20 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (“The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his 
race is the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions program. . . . No matter how strong their 
qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to 
educational diversity, [applicants who are not “Negro, Asian, or Chicano”] are never afforded the 
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the 
same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.”); 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that “[u]nder our 
Constitution, any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin 
is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid” and that “[u]nder our Constitution, the government 
may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that person’s race”); id. at 547 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“The ultimate goal must be to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking 
such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race.”); Erman & Walton, supra note 14, at 352, 359 
(arguing that “[m]erit stalks equal protection jurisprudence” as “a shadow interest, treated as 
compelling but as yet undeclared” and that the “Court is often protective of standardized tests and 
grades, which it views as generally open, competitive, and relatively accurate predictors of subsequent 
performance”). Similar principles have informed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of statutory 
regimes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977) (“Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil 
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. . . . ‘[Title VII] provides that men and women shall be 
employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as 
Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States.’” (quoting 100 CONG. REC. 
13,088 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey))). 
 22. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville 
(Northeastern Florida), 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (holding that in the presence of a racial classification, 
a cognizable claim exists even if the plaintiff would not have received the benefit absent the racial 
classification). 
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A trio of cases in the 1970s solidified intent doctrine as the standard 
governing challenges to facially neutral state action.23 These cases culminated 
with Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,24 a 1979 decision that 
involved a “veterans’ preference statute.”25 The statute did not formally 
differentiate between men and women.26 Nonetheless, because covered veterans 
were predominately male, the statute operated “overwhelmingly to the 
advantage of males.”27 The plaintiff, a woman who was not a veteran, alleged 
that the law’s disparate impact violated the Equal Protection Clause.28 
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, rejected the challenge.29 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Stewart acknowledged that “many [laws] affect certain 
groups unevenly” even though the laws themselves treat all individuals equally.30 
Nonetheless, because “the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not 
equal results,” the majority concluded that such laws do not offend the 
Constitution.31 Rather, to be deemed unconstitutional, the law must be “traced 
to a discriminatory purpose.”32 
Although not so named, Justice Stewart’s general acceptance of the 
veterans’ preference statute, and disparate impact more generally, is consistent 
with a vision of equal protection that privileges every person’s right to compete. 
For purposes of the selection process at issue in Feeney, merit was defined with 
respect to veteran status. If an individual had served in the military, they were 
entitled to the corresponding benefit, irrespective of their gender.33 Thus, 
notwithstanding the group-based disparate impact, the statute and its 
implementation did not offend an individualistic vision of constitutional equality 
that was beginning to percolate across the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
decisions. 
Feeney followed on the heels of Washington v. Davis34 and Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,35 two decisions 
that similarly upheld facially neutral state action.36 In Feeney, Justice Stewart 
 
 23. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278–79; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. 
 24. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 25. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259; see Haney-López, supra note 10, at 1828 (“Extending Powell’s 
analysis in Bakke, Feeney split equal protection into the separate domains now taken for granted, one 
governing affirmative action and the other discrimination against non-Whites.”). 
 26. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280. 
 27. Id. at 259. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 273. 
 30. Id. at 271–72. 
 31. Id. at 273. 
 32. Id. at 272. 
 33. In other words, at the moment of “competition,” all candidates had the opportunity to 
compete on the basis of their existing “merit,” here defined as past military service. 
 34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 35. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 36. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (“But, as was made clear in Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., even if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse 
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situated his reasoning in this then-recent precedent. First, he invoked Davis, in 
which the Supreme Court upheld an employment test that had a disparate 
impact on African Americans.37 Justice Stewart noted that according to the 
Davis majority, the employment test did not violate the Constitution because, 
notwithstanding its racially disparate impact, “there had been no showing that 
racial discrimination entered into the establishment or formulation of the test.”38 
Justice Stewart also drew on Arlington Heights, in which the plaintiffs’ claim 
failed because the challenged policy “was shown to be nothing more than an 
application of a constitutionally neutral zoning policy.”39 
The preference for facially neutral state action seen in these cases can be 
understood as resting, in part, on the interplay between values and empirical 
assumptions. As for values, Supreme Court majorities were beginning to 
privilege an individualistic vision of constitutional equality.40 As for empirical 
assumptions, these same Justices presumed that facially neutral classifications, to 
the extent they produced any harm at all, did so at the group level.41 Justice 
Stewart viewed group-based harms as constitutionally suspect in at least one 
instance: when group-based animus motivates a facially neutral policy.42 Yet with 
the exception of such cases, Justice Stewart appeared to presume that facially 
neutral policies do not, of themselves, offend the Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection.43 
The emergence of this right to compete played a more explicit role in the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of racial classifications. In the year preceding Feeney, 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,44 the Supreme Court struck 
down the Davis Medical School’s admissions program, which set aside 16 of 100 
 
effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that 
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” (citations omitted)). 
 37. Id. at 273. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 274. 
 40. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282–83 (2011) [hereinafter Siegel, From 
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization] (“Race conservatives first invoked colorblindness in cases 
involving the constitutionality of ‘benign’ racial classifications, where they insisted that the 
Constitution’s injunction against classifying on the basis of race vindicated values of individualism.”). 
 41. See Haney-López, supra note 10, at 1828. In the context of facially neutral state action, the 
Court imagines discrimination to occur, if at all, at the group level. This is apparent in Feeney, where 
the “because of” inquiry arises vis-à-vis the group (Was this policy adopted because of its group-based 
impact?), not the individual applicant (Was this individual hired because of her identity?). See Feeney, 
442 U.S. at 279 (“‘Discriminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.” (citation omitted)). The one exception being “ostensibly neutral” policies used as 
an “obvious pretext for racial discrimination.” Id. at 272. 
 42. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 
 43. See id. at 271–72. 
 44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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spots for students from “minority” racial groups.45 Justice Stewart’s Feeney 
opinion did not explicitly invoke Bakke. This is surprising, in part, because 
Justice Stewart could have situated his analysis in Feeney within Justice Powell’s 
articulation of the underlying constitutional harm at play in Bakke. 
The litigation was initiated by Alan Bakke, a white man who the Medical 
School had rejected in two consecutive years.46 Multiple amici argued that Bakke 
lacked standing to bring an equal protection claim because he “never showed 
that his injury—exclusion from the Medical School—w[ould] be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”47 This assertion rested on two related contentions. First, 
amici argued that the Medical School’s use of race (the set-aside program) did 
not cause the alleged harm (Bakke’s rejections).48 Second, amici argued that 
because the set-aside did not cause Bakke’s injury, a favorable decision 
(enjoining the set-aside) would not have remedied that harm.49 
Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, responded to the 
amici’s concerns about causation and redressability by reframing the relevant 
constitutional harm.50 According to Justice Powell, the constitutional injury was 
not Bakke’s rejection.51 Rather, the Medical School’s race-conscious set-aside 
constituted a cognizable injury in itself, even if Bakke would have been rejected 
in its absence: 
The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff’s demonstration of 
any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by favorable decision 
of his claim. The trial court found such an injury, apart from failure to 
be admitted, in the University’s decision not to permit Bakke to 
compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race.52 
As characterized by Justice Powell, the Medical School denied Bakke an 
“opportunity to compete for every seat in the class,”53 a cognizable harm even 
were Bakke “unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence 
of the special program.”54 Or as Justice Powell stated in response to his liberal 
colleagues, the “principal evil” of the set-aside was that it denied Bakke his 
 
 45. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the challenged policy defined 
“minority” racial groups to include individuals who were “viewed as ‘Blacks,’ ‘Chicanos,’ ‘Asians,’ and 
‘American Indians’”). 
 46. Id. at 276–77. 
 47. Id. at 280 n.14. To establish constitutional standing, (1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an 
‘injury in fact’” (an injury that “is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent’”), 
(2) “there must be a causal connection between” the alleged conduct and harm, and (3) “it must be 
‘likely’” that a favorable decision would redress the injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560–61 (1992) (citations omitted) (first quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); and 
then quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–43 (1976)). 
 48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 281 n.14. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 319–20. 
 54. Id. at 280–81 n.14. 
522 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
“right to individualized consideration without regard to his race.”55 In so stating, 
Justice Powell offered an early articulation of the principle I have termed the 
right to compete. 
In the years since, this principle has ascended across the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence. Roughly a decade after Bakke and Feeney, in 
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,56 six Justices invoked similar reasoning to 
strike down Richmond, Virginia’s Minority Business Utilization Plan (the 
Richmond Plan).57 The Richmond Plan required contractors to subcontract at 
least 30% of the contract to one or more “Minority Business Enterprises.”58 In 
an opinion authored by Justice O’Connor, the majority suggested that the 
race-conscious plan created “tension between the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal treatment to all citizens, and the use of race-based measures 
to ameliorate the effect of past discrimination.”59 According to Justice 
O’Connor:  
The Richmond Plan den[ied] certain citizens the opportunity to 
compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon 
their race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their 
“personal rights” to be treated with equal dignity and respect are 
implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect 
of public decisionmaking.60 
Framed in this way, the majority construed the Richmond Plan as a state 
intervention that deprived individuals the opportunity to compete in a 
tournament untainted by race.61 The policy, accordingly, demanded strict judicial 
scrutiny—notwithstanding the fact that it comprised an attempt to remedy and 
redress a legacy of racial discrimination in the Confederacy’s former capital.62 
Roughly fifteen years later, a series of cases challenging racial classifications 
solidified the primacy of a right to compete within the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. First, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated 
General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville,63 the Supreme Court 
examined Jacksonville’s “Minority Business Enterprises” set-aside.64 Similar to 
the Richmond Plan, Jacksonville’s ordinance required that 10% of funds spent 
annually on city contracts be set aside for minority-owned businesses.65 An 
 
 55. Id. at 318 n.52; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (“The importance of 
this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is 
paramount.”). 
 56. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 57. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 476–77. 
 60. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 493–94. 
 62. Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when the 
former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of racial discrimination in its 
midst.”). 
 63. 508 U.S. 656 (1993). 
 64. Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 658, 666. 
 65. Id. at 658. 
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association of individuals and firms who did not qualify for the set-aside 
challenged the ordinance.66 
Prior to the suit reaching the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed it on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 
ordinance.67 According to the court of appeals, the plaintiffs failed to establish 
that, but for the set-aside, any of their members would have bid successfully for a 
city contract.68 The plaintiffs, accordingly, failed to demonstrate that the 
challenged policy had caused “any injury.”69 
When it received the ensuing appeal, the Supreme Court framed the 
relevant question as “whether, in order to have standing to challenge the 
ordinance, an association of contractors is required to show that one of its 
members would have received a contract absent the ordinance.”70 In an opinion 
authored by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that no such requirement 
exists.71 Drawing on Bakke and Croson, Justice Thomas concluded: 
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for 
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of 
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the 
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for 
the barrier in order to establish standing.72 
Under such facts, the plaintiff need not establish—nor even plead—that she 
would have received the subject benefit but for the challenged policy.73 To the 
contrary, Justice Thomas wrote that “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection 
case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition 
of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”74 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 
1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate injury of an economic nature. While 
over $14,000,000 in contracts was allocated to minority contractors during the set-aside program’s 
five-year tenure, plaintiff has not demonstrated that, but for the program, any AGC member would 
have bid successfully for any of these contracts.”), rev’d, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1220. 
 70. Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 658. 
 71. Id. at 666. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed the lone dissent and argued 
that the case should have been dismissed as moot. See id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 666 (majority opinion). 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. Others have revealed that this approach to standing (and causation) has been applied 
inconsistently across the Court’s equal protection case law. See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded 
Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1461–62 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court applies different 
standing standards as a function of whether the challenged policy promotes the interests of whites or 
communities of color); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–95 (1987) (rendering statistical 
evidence of racial discrimination insufficient to establish proof of “purposeful discrimination”); City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that a Black plaintiff who had previously been 
subjected to a chokehold had failed to establish a case or controversy with the defendant City of Los 
Angeles that would justify the equitable relief sought); Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Eyes 
Wide Open: What Social Science Can Tell Us About the Supreme Court’s Use of Social Science, 112 
524 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
The Court has since reaffirmed an individual’s constitutional right to 
“compete on an equal footing.”75 Just two years later, in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena,76 a majority of Justices invoked Northeastern Florida to justify 
extending strict scrutiny to all racial classifications.77 Specifically, the Adarand 
majority quoted Northeastern Florida for the proposition that where government 
decisionmaking “prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing,” 
the plaintiff “need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the 
barrier in order to establish standing.”78 
Four years later, in Texas v. Lesage,79 the Supreme Court quieted any 
lingering doubts about the cognizability of a right to compete claim.80 Lesage 
featured François Lesage, an “African immigrant of Caucasian descent” who 
challenged his rejection from a University of Texas Ph.D. program that 
employed a race-conscious admissions process.81 The district court dismissed 
Lesage’s claim based on evidence that he would have been rejected even under a 
colorblind regime.82 The Fifth Circuit reversed.83 Pointing to Adarand, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that because Lesage had been rejected during a 
race-conscious stage of the admissions process, he had “suffered an implied 
injury”—the inability to “compet[e] on an equal footing.”84 
The Supreme Court used the competing lower court opinions as an 
opportunity to clarify the law. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court 
distinguished Lesage’s backward-looking claim (which sought money damages 
and challenged his individual rejection) from a potential forward-looking claim 
 
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 247, 253–55 (2018) (discussing the conservative Justices’ inconsistent 
causation requirements). 
 75. Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 666. 
 76. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 77. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211. 
 78. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 667); see also Byers v. 
City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1998) (“These cases all stand for the proposition 
that when a plaintiff is denied the opportunity to compete on an equal basis because of that plaintiff’s 
race or gender, the denial of the opportunity to compete on equal footing constitutes an injury in fact 
for standing purposes.”). 
 79. 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (per curiam). 
 80. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21; see also Raj Shah, An Article III Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: 
A Critical Race Perspective on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Standing Jurisprudence, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
196, 204 (2013) (describing an apparent contradiction between the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
plaintiff’s claims in Lesage and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297 (2013), 
cases that involved comparable facts). 
 81. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 19. 
 82. Id. at 19–20. 
 83. Id. at 20. 
 84. Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995)) (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification 
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’ Thus, even though the district court may 
have correctly predicted that Lesage suffered no direct injury and therefore incurred no compensatory 
damages, this scenario does not foreclose the availability of some other relief to which he may be 
entitled.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211)), rev’d in part, 
528 U.S. 18 (1999). 
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(which could have sought injunctive relief and challenged the admissions process 
itself).85 The Court explained that “where a plaintiff challenges a discrete 
governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is 
undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, 
there is no cognizable injury.”86 In contrast, Lesage could have proceeded under 
a forward-looking posture that sought to enjoin an admissions process that 
denied him the right to “compete on an equal footing” with other candidates.87 
In the context of racial classifications, this concept of a right to compete 
continues to satisfy standing and causation requirements even where a plaintiff 
fails to “affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if 
race were not considered.”88 Its application has been critical for plaintiffs 
challenging racial classifications in admissions. Grutter v. Bollinger89 and Gratz v. 
Bollinger,90 companion cases concerning race-conscious admissions policies at 
the University of Michigan, offer two notable examples.91 The same occurred in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,92 where 
the majority identified a right to compete theory of discrimination to justify the 
plaintiff-parents’ rights to sue on their children’s behalf.93 Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for the majority, invoked Adarand and Northeastern Florida to buttress 
his conclusion that “[a]s we have held, one form of injury under the Equal 
Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may 
prejudice the plaintiff.”94 
C. Related Concerns: Social Cohesion and Racial Stigma 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting two additional concerns that, 
alongside the right to compete, have often informed the Supreme Court’s equal 
 
 85. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20–21. 
 86. Id. at 21. 
 87. Id. (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of 
Jacksonville (Northeastern Florida), 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). 
 88. Id.; cf. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) 
(“The express discrimination against religious exercise here is not the denial of a grant, but rather the 
refusal to allow the Church—solely because it is a church—to compete with secular organizations for a 
grant.” (citing Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 666)). 
 89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 90. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 91. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 (“Petitioner further alleged that her application was rejected 
because the Law School uses race as a ‘predominant’ factor, giving applicants who belong to certain 
minority groups ‘a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from 
disfavored racial groups.’ . . . Petitioner clearly has standing to bring this lawsuit.” (citing Northeastern 
Florida, 508 U.S. at 666)); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 262 (“In bringing his equal protection challenge against 
the University’s use of race in undergraduate admissions, Hamacher alleged that the University had 
denied him the opportunity to compete for admission on an equal basis.”). 
 92. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 93. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 719 (“Moreover, Parents Involved also asserted an interest in 
not being ‘forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding 
factor in many of its admissions decisions.’”). 
 94. Id. (first citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995); and then citing 
Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 666). 
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protection jurisprudence: social cohesion and racial stigma.95 These concerns are 
not unique to the Supreme Court’s conservative Justices.96 Nor do they 
necessarily lead to a preference for facially neutral state action over racial 
classifications.97 Nonetheless, these concerns have contributed to the Supreme 
Court’s hostility toward racial classifications. This has been facilitated, in part, by 
two interlocking assumptions. First, the Supreme Court has assumed that racial 
classifications offend the right to compete by conferring racial “preferences” at 
 
 95. Certain Justices have also argued that racial classifications are problematic because they 
undermine the goal of a truly colorblind society. See id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Crude 
measures of this sort threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one 
school’s supply and another’s demand.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those 
classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time 
the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens 
or benefits, it demeans us all.”). For a more comprehensive overview of the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to social cohesion, see Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 40, 
at 1282. Stigma concerns have also evolved over the past fifty years. See Richard A. Primus, Equal 
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 566–67 (2003) (“Leading 
decisions from Strauder v. West Virginia to Brown v. Board of Education turned at least in part on the 
anti-egalitarian social meanings of the practices at issue. More recently, in Adarand, Shaw v. Reno, and 
Croson, the problem of expressive harm has contributed to the unconstitutionality of race-conscious 
measures intended to benefit historically disadvantaged groups.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Charles 
Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 125–26 
(1990) (“This standard attempts to distinguish between racial distinctions that stigmatize and those 
whose purpose is inclusive, to bring in groups that have in some sense suffered disadvantage. But this 
is the Court’s benignity conception all over again; it is precisely the point made by both dissenting 
opinions that playing politics with race is inherently too dangerous to be allowed to go forward on so 
subjective and indefinite a basis.”); Lawrence III, supra note 2, at 351 (“Stigmatizing actions harm the 
individual in two ways: They inflict psychological injury by assaulting a person’s self-respect and 
human dignity, and they brand the individual with a sign that signals her inferior status to others and 
designates her as an outcast. The stigma theory recognizes the importance of both self-esteem and the 
respect of others for participating in society’s benefits and responsibilities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 96. The Court’s liberal Justices have also expressed anxieties that racial classifications may 
stigmatize their intended beneficiaries. These concerns appear rooted in the conflation of racial 
classifications with racial “preferences.” See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144, 173–74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (suggesting that “preferential treatment may 
act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although intended to correct systemic or institutional 
inequities, such a policy may imply to some the recipients’ inferiority and especial need for 
protection”); see also id. at 174 n.3 (“This phenomenon seems to have arisen with respect to policies 
affording preferential treatment to women: thus groups dedicated to advancing the legal position of 
women have appeared before this Court to challenge statutes that facially offer advantages to women 
and not men. This strategy, one surmises, can be explained on the basis that even good-faith policies 
favoring women may serve to highlight stereotypes concerning their supposed dependency and 
helplessness.” (citation omitted)). 
 97. See Lawrence III, supra note 2, at 379 (“An initial difficulty with applying the cultural 
meaning test arises from the fact that we are not a monolithic culture. There may be instances in which 
governmental action is given different meanings by two subcultures within the larger culture.”); 
Primus, supra note 95, at 580 (“Conversely, and crucially for evaluations of disparate impact laws, 
many reasonable whites may see race-conscious laws designed to remedy the continuing effects of 
historical discrimination as carrying meanings other than those that many reasonable nonwhites might 
see.”). 
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the expense of “innocent” third parties.98 Second, predicated on the view that 
such selection processes constitute a deviation from racial neutrality, Justices 
have voiced the concern that racial classifications will stigmatize their intended 
beneficiaries and antagonize those from disfavored racial groups.99 
This interaction was on display in Bakke, when Justice Powell opined that 
“preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that 
certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on 
a factor having no relation to individual worth.”100 Responding to his liberal 
colleagues, Powell reiterated: 
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits 
on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by 
the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal 
rights and opportunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore 
may be perceived as invidious. . . . One should not lightly dismiss the 
inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that 
accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis 
of skin color and ethnic origin.101 
Two years later, Justice Stevens echoed similar sentiment in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick,102 a case involving a federal minority set-aside program: 
[A] statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an 
assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less 
qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race. 
Because that perception—especially when fostered by the Congress of 
the United States—can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial 
prejudice, it will delay the time when race will become a truly 
irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor.103 
 
 98. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 84 (1986) (“Once past discrimination provided a justifying purpose for affirmative 
action measures, those measures might still be overturned, some Justices suggested, if they visited too 
much punishment on ‘innocent third parties.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) 
(Powell, J., concurring))). 
 99. See, e.g.¸ Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of 
this policy all are tarred as undeserving. . . . When blacks take positions in the highest places of 
government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part 
in their advancement.”); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978) 
(“Disparate constitutional tolerance of such [racial] classifications well may serve to exacerbate racial 
and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them.”); see also Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization, supra note 40, at 1299 (“Justice O’Connor interprets equal protection so as to 
promote social cohesion and to avoid racial arrangements that balkanize and threaten social 
cohesion.”). 
 100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. 
 101. Id. at 294 n.34. 
 102. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 103. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 547 
(“Preferences based on characteristics acquired at birth foster intolerance and antagonism against the 
entire membership of the favored classes.”). 
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Foreshadowing decades of equal protection case law,104 these anxieties about 
racial resentment and stigma help to illuminate the empirical assumptions that 
adorn the Supreme Court’s preference for facially neutral selection processes. 
But what if these basic empirical assumptions are flawed? What if facially 
neutral evaluative tools, even if “colorblind,” do not offer a fair appraisal of each 
applicant’s existing abilities but rather systematically mismeasure existing talent, 
preparation, and motivation on a racial basis? This sort of a measurement defect 
would call into question the logic of a doctrinal regime that privileges facially 
neutral selection processes on the ground that such tools promote every person’s 
right to compete. 
As I discuss in Section II, growing empirical scholarship suggests that such 
defects may, in fact, be widespread across common facially neutral evaluative 
tools. The Supreme Court’s faith in such instruments may in turn be misplaced. 
The social science accordingly reveals that contemporary equal protection 
doctrine may not be giving the Supreme Court what it says it wants. 
II. RACIAL MISMEASURES: WHEN FACIAL NEUTRALITY FAILS 
The Supreme Court has constructed a doctrinal machine that prefers 
facially neutral selection procedures over racial classifications. Assuming the 
doctrine is designed to promote the right to compete, one would expect that 
facially neutral evaluative tools produce “racially neutral results.” In this 
context, I employ the phrase racially neutral results in a limited sense. I mean 
only that the underlying evaluative instrument measures the same attribute of 
each competitor with equal accuracy and precision, irrespective of the 
competitor’s race.105 
In other words, equal protection doctrine rests on the presumption that 
facially neutral evaluative tools produce racially neutral results. This 
presumption spans Justices and ideological spectrums,106 arises within federal 
 
 104. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“So-called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently 
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. 
Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment 
among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race. These 
programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or 
to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
604 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether providing benefits to or burdening particular racial 
or ethnic groups, [racial classifications] may stigmatize those groups singled out for different treatment 
and may create considerable tension with the Nation’s widely shared commitment to evaluating 
individuals upon their individual merit.”); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 
(1989) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly 
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a 
politics of racial hostility.”). 
 105. There are, of course, competing conceptions of “racial neutrality.” Within this Article, 
given my argument that equal protection doctrine disserves the right to compete, I adhere to the 
conception of “racial neutrality” embedded across contemporary equal protection doctrine. 
 106. This includes Justices who defend affirmative action. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 
312, 326 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It thus appears that by the Committee’s own assessment, it 
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antidiscrimination law,107 and appears within disparate impact theory itself.108 
Yet notwithstanding the ubiquity of this presumption, growing empirical 
scholarship calls into question this rarely interrogated assumption.109 As I review 
in greater detail below, decades of research on implicit bias and stereotype threat 
reveals that common measures of merit, although facially neutral, fail to produce 
racially neutral results.110 Rather, they produce what I term “racial 
mismeasures,”111 a concept I use to describe facially neutral tools that 
predictably and systematically mismeasure merit because of an individual’s 
race.112 
Racial mismeasures fall into two general categories. The first category 
includes tools susceptible to “shifting standards” defects. This category captures 
evaluative instruments that, although intended to be neutral and objective, 
nonetheless produce different “scores” for the same performance. The second 
 
admitted minority students who, by the tests given, seemed less qualified than some white students 
who were not accepted . . . .”). 
 107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a 
respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or 
promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, 
employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 108. See Primus, supra note 95, at 563–64 (“Nothing in disparate impact doctrine calls for 
individual employees or applicants to be treated differently from one another on racial grounds at the 
moment an employment decision is made.”). 
 109. See generally RACHEL D. GODSIL ET AL., PERCEPTION INST., THE SCIENCE OF EQUALITY, 
VOLUME 1: ADDRESSING IMPLICIT BIAS, RACIAL ANXIETY, AND STEREOTYPE THREAT IN 
EDUCATION AND HEALTHCARE (2014) (summarizing the implicit bias and stereotype threat research); 
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Revolution: Reconceiving the Relation 
Between Conscious and Unconscious, 72 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 861 (2017) (distinguishing between 
implicit and explicit biases). 
 110. The implicit bias scholarship is one component of the broad canon of literature on 
cognitive biases and heuristics. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–30 (1974) (describing predictable judgment 
errors); see also Monica Biernat & Melvin Manis, Shifting Standards and Stereotype-Based Judgments, 
66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1994) (employing a model that “suggests that subjective 
judgments of target persons from different social groups may fail to reveal the stereotyped 
expectations of judges”); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining 
Merit To Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 474 (2005) (“For example, decision makers may 
view the credentials of a specific male applicant as essential to job success and view his areas of 
weakness as nonessential. Alternatively, they may downplay the importance of a female applicant’s 
areas of expertise and inflate the importance of her areas of weakness.”). 
 111. I focus on racial mismeasures given the centrality of racial neutrality within the equal 
protection context. But as a descriptive matter, measurement defects akin to those described in this 
Article transcend race. See generally Jonathan Feingold, Note, Racing Towards Color-Blindness: 
Stereotype Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 231 (2011) 
[hereinafter Feingold, Racing Towards Color-Blindness] (describing how stereotype threat can affect 
individuals from any social category that is negatively stereotyped in the relevant domain). 
 112. As a result, racial mismeasures produce race-based Type I and Type II errors. See Jerry 
Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
465, 518 n.251 (2010) (“A Type I error is a false positive, which involves rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is in fact true. This is seeing something that is not actually there. A Type II error is a false 
negative, which involves accepting the null hypothesis when it is in fact false. This is being blind to 
something that is actually there.”). 
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category includes evaluative instruments susceptible to “uneven conditions” 
defects. This set of instruments compromises the right to compete because they 
subject certain performers, because of their race, to materially different 
conditions during performance (but fail to account for this difference). 
Before diving deeper into the topic of racial mismeasures, it may be helpful 
to make explicit a few basic points. First, my engagement with racial 
mismeasures is, at its core, designed to illuminate that equal protection doctrine 
often fails to provide the Supreme Court what it says it wants. For this reason, 
my contention that racial mismeasures contravene the right to compete is not a 
concession that this principle offers a doctrinally persuasive or morally satisfying 
vision of constitutional equality.113 Second, the claim that an evaluative 
instrument constitutes a racial mismeasure is distinct from the critique that a 
particular metric is contextually irrelevant (e.g., it is not job related); that 
standard conceptions of merit are shallow and function to preserve white 
interests; and that prevailing notions of racial neutrality fail to account for 
historical and structural forces that inform an individual’s access to resources, 
networks, and opportunities earlier in time.114 Even if dissatisfying to some, my 
engagement with racial mismeasures is intentionally limited. Specifically, by 
focusing on individuals and their abilities at a specific point in time, the racial 
mismeasures conversation centers the critical insight that common measures of 
merit, such as the standard job interview or the SAT, often understate the 
existing talent and potential of individuals from negatively stereotyped groups.115 
This, in turn, troubles the notion that prevailing doctrinal arrangements promote 
a vision of constitutional equality that centers the right to compete. 
 
 113. Other authors have critiqued the notions of merit that travel through Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and inform the notion of a “right to compete.” See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Persuasion 
and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1333 (1986) 
(explaining that merit is an inherently unstable and contextually specific construct); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 586 (1996) (“This myth of meritocracy rests 
on two dominant assumptions: (1) that female lawyers are already achieving close to proportionate 
representation in almost all professional contexts; and (2) that any lingering disparities are attributable 
to women’s own ‘different’ choices and capabilities.”); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the 
Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (1997) (arguing that merit in the law 
school admissions context, as constructed, was tied “to the profession’s desire to bar entry to 
immigrants and people of color). My focus on racial mismeasures is also distinct from arguments that 
challenge a metric’s general predictive validity. See Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, 
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1270, 1314 (1995) [hereinafter 
Selmi, Testing for Equality] (noting that “[i]n the best scenario, employment tests provide only limited 
predictive information so that it is difficult to make confident distinctions among individuals based 
solely on their test scores” and that “[t]est scores, at best, are imprecise measures of ability, however if 
used properly they can provide some information to employers”); Kimberly West-Faulcon, More 
Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1235, 1241 (2011) (“Research 
demonstrates that the predictive inadequacies of, and scientifically unjustified racial differences in, 
scores on conventional factorist tests like the SAT may be legally cognizable ‘test deficiencies.’”). 
 114. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back To 
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1327–40 (2011). 
 115. See infra Part II.A. 
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A. Shifting Standards 
Evaluative tools can be understood as machines with inputs and outputs. 
Take a bathroom scale. The input consists of the weight pressing against the 
scale. The output consists of the weight (in, for instance, pounds or kilograms) 
the scale reports back out. If properly calibrated, input and output align; 
everyone who weighs 160 pounds will see 160 pounds when they step on the 
scale.116 But if the scale is not properly calibrated, it will produce a 
mismeasurement. If it systematically overreports 5 pounds, the scale will read 
165 pounds even though its current occupant weighs 160 pounds. Assuming a 
mismeasurement affects everyone equally, irrespective of their race, we can call 
it a race-neutral measurement error. 
But consider a scenario in which our scale overreports five pounds, but only 
for Asians, and underreports five pounds, but only for Latinos. The 
measurement error is now race-dependent. Asians are lighter than the scale 
suggests; Latinos are heavier. The scale, because it produces a race-dependent 
measurement error, constitutes what I refer to as a “shifting standards” racial 
mismeasure. The bathroom scale, our facially neutral tool, is designed to be race 
neutral. Nonetheless, it produces scores for the same performance because of an 
individual’s race. If you are Latino, you take a five-pound hit; if you are Asian, 
you receive a five-pound boost. 
Bathroom scales are unlikely to dictate winners and losers in high-stakes 
competitions for admission or employment. Nonetheless, this example offers a 
useful analogue to a common tool vulnerable to shifting standards measurement 
errors: human judgment. The Supreme Court may be correct that human 
discretion is often a “presumptively reasonable way of doing business.”117 But 
even if presumptively reasonable, human discretion is far less objective or 
neutral than we often believe. 
Diverse bodies of scholarship have engaged the fallibility of human 
judgment and decisionmaking. Behavioral law and economics, for instance, is 
predicated on decades of research that reveals we are not the rational and 
objective actors we long presumed ourselves to be.118 Related scholarship on 
implicit social cognitions—including that on implicit bias—continues to shed 
light on the reality that our evaluations of a person’s performance can be shaped 
by the performer’s social identity, even when it is not our intent.119 
 
 116. Just because a scale functions properly does not mean it is a useful measure of merit. If a 
company is hiring computer scientists, it would be hard to justify hiring decisions that turned on 
candidates’ weights. In contrast, weight might be an appropriate metric on a wrestling team that is 
adding one member to compete in a particular weight class. 
 117. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011). 
 118. See Torben Emmerling, D.R.I.V.E.: A Practical Framework for Applying Behavioural 
Science in Strategy (“At the core of this behavioural trend in strategy lies the insight that humans, in 
reality, do not behave in line with the assumptions of rationality (e.g., complete and transitive 
preferences) postulated by standard economic theory.” (citation omitted)), in THE BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS GUIDE 2018, at 36, 37 (Alain Samson ed., 2018). 
 119. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas F. Pettigrew, With Malice Toward None and Charity 
for Some: Ingroup Favoritism Enables Discrimination, 69 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 669, 669–70 (2014) 
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Given its ubiquity across legal scholarship, a concise review of implicit bias 
literature should suffice.120 The science demonstrates that humans possess 
systemic and pervasive biases—often in the form of attitudes and stereotypes—
about social categories like race, gender, and age.121 Biases tend to favor 
majority groups over minority groups.122 Some biases are implicit, in the sense 
that they cannot be measured through direct measures such as self-reports.123 
Rather, they must be measured through indirect techniques, such as lexicon 
exercises and the now well-known Implicit Association Test (IAT).124 Critically, 
as documented in hundreds of individual studies and multiple meta-analyses, 
implicit biases predict disparate treatment as a function of the performer’s social 
identity, particularly in socially salient contexts.125 The research, in short, 
 
(describing the prevalence of ingroup favoritism); Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some 
Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627, 629 (2015) [hereinafter Kang, 
Rethinking Intent and Impact] (discussing evidence that implicit biases lead to unintentional disparate 
treatment). 
 120. See Girvan, supra note 4, at 7–9 (surveying implicit bias within legal scholarship); Tristin K. 
Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 420 
(2011) (“The importance of the cognitive turn in the social sciences, including research relying on the 
[Implicit Association Test], cannot be understated. It has unquestionably advanced our understanding 
of how discrimination operates and also our thinking about how discrimination might be reduced.”). 
 121. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012) 
(“One type of bias is driven by attitudes and stereotypes that we have about social categories, such as 
genders and races.”); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 45–57 (2007) (describing age-related, gender-related, 
and race-related implicit attitudes). 
 122. Nosek et al., supra note 121, at 41 (“Both implicitly and explicitly, respondents preferred, 
for example, White, young, abled, straight, and thin people over their complementary categories.”). 
 123. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 109, at 861–62 (explaining the difference between 
explicit biases and implicit biases). 
 124. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: 
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998) [hereinafter 
Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences]. Members of the public can take any number of 
IATs at http://www.projectimplicit.org. For a description of the IAT, see generally Anthony G. 
Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of 
Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 18 (2009) [hereinafter Greenwald et al., 
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity], which describes the Implicit Association Test. 
 125. See generally Greenwald & Pettigrew, supra note 119 (describing the prevalence of 
in-group favoritism); Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of 
Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 886 (2010) (observing that pro-white biases predicted 
more favorable evaluations of white litigators); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations 
Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial 
Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001) (observing correlation between implicit bias 
and intergroup behavior); Dan-Olof Rooth, Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real 
World Evidence, 17 LABOUR ECON. 523 (2010) (observing correlation between implicit bias and 
callback decisions); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash 
Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743 (2001) (observing that women were punished for 
performing in counter-stereotypical ways); Christian Unkelbach et al., The Turban Effect: The 
Influence of Muslim Headgear and Induced Affect on Aggressive Responses in the Shooter Bias 
Paradigm, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1409 (2008) (finding that in a computer game 
simulation, participants were more likely to shoot at Muslim targets). For competing meta-analyses, 
both of which observe a correlation between implicit bias and behavior, compare Greenwald et al., 
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illuminates that human judgment is susceptible to shifting standards 
measurement errors and that these errors will predictably function to the benefit 
of individuals from socially advantaged groups, while penalizing individuals from 
groups that face negative biases in the relevant domain.126 
Implicit bias scholarship may dominate headlines, but it comprises a single 
piece in a broader mosaic of scholarship that reveals the fallibility of human 
judgment. A separate but related body of literature comes in the form of audit 
studies.127 Historically, audit studies were used to uncover covert intentional race 
discrimination, often in domains such as housing or employment.128 More 
recently, audit studies have become a powerful vehicle to expose both 
intentional and unintentional disparate treatment in contexts involving human 
discretion.129 
A 2014 study by Arin Reeves offers a salient example.130 Reeves invited 
partners from large law firms to participate in what was presented as a general 
writing activity.131 All participants evaluated the same legal memo, which 
contained a cover letter with information about the author.132 Half of the 
 
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, supra note 124, at 24, which observed average predictive validity 
correlation of r = .236 on racially discriminatory behavior, with Frederick L. Oswald et al., Predicting 
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 178 (2013), which reported an effect size of r = .15. 
 126. See generally GODSIL ET AL., supra note 109, at 25–26, 34–43 (reviewing studies). 
 127. The standard audit study is a controlled field experiment in which pairs of testers with 
comparable qualifications except for a salient dimension of identity (such as race) attempt to, for 
instance, rent an apartment. See Sun Jung Oh & John Yinger, What Have We Learned from Paired 
Testing in Housing Markets?, 17 CITYSCAPE 15 (2015) (reviewing housing market audit studies in the 
United States and Europe). 
 128. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 104–10 (Rebecca 
M. Blank et al. eds., 2004) (reviewing audit study techniques). 
 129. See Steven D. Levitt, Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from Weakest Link, 47 
J.L. & ECON. 431, 432 (2004) (reviewing audit studies); Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for 
Studies of Employment Discrimination: Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future, 609 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 112 (2007) (reviewing audit studies of racial discrimination 
in employment); Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians’ 
Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 621–23 (1999) (employing 
audit study techniques to expose influence of patient race and sex on physician’s management of chest 
pain). 
 130. ARIN N. REEVES, NEXTIONS, YELLOW PAPER SERIES 2014-0404, WRITTEN IN BLACK & 
WHITE: EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING SKILLS (2014), 
http://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LMB6-ZBZF]; see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and 
Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (finding that résumés with white-sounding names were 
more likely to receive callbacks than resumes with Black-sounding names); Claudia Goldin & Cecilia 
Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 715 (2000) (documenting gender-based different standards in the context of orchestra 
auditions). 
 131. REEVES, supra note 130. 
 132. Id. 
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participants received a cover letter indicating the author was Black; the other 
half received a cover letter indicating the author was white.133 
Reeves did not employ a device such as the IAT to measure the 
participants’ implicit biases.134 Nonetheless, the study exposed the fallibility of 
human judgment. Although performance (the memo) was identical across all 
participants, the memo associated with the white author received more favorable 
quantitative and qualitative evaluations across general and specific criteria.135 
Social scientists continue to expose shifting standards through statistical 
techniques that permit researchers to analyze large data sets.136 One recent 
analysis of more than 4.5 million traffic stops in North Carolina provides a 
pertinent example.137 In this analysis of real-world data, Stanford researchers 
interrogated whether, and to what degree, a driver’s race predicted whether 
police would initiate a search following a traffic stop.138 The researchers 
observed that Black and Latino drivers were more likely than white drivers to be 
subject to a search.139 They also found that Black and Latino drivers were less 
likely to possess contraband than white drivers.140 
As the study’s authors note, these racial disparities do not, in themselves, 
confirm that the officers evaluated the same behavior differently because it was 
theoretically possible that the racial disparities were caused by actual 
group-based differences in performance.141 To assess this possibility, the 
researchers employed a threshold test to determine the level of objective 
suspicion required by police to search the average driver as a function of race.142 
This targeted analysis revealed that, across jurisdictions, police required roughly 
twice the level of objective suspicion to search white drivers than Black or Latino 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Such techniques are not novel to litigation. Title VII systemic disparate treatment plaintiffs, 
for instance, have long relied on the inferential statistics produced through sophisticated statistical 
analyses, though not always successfully. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356–
60, (2011) (considering the plaintiffs’ allegation of systemic disparate treatment in promotions); Floyd 
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing NYPD stop-and-frisk data). 
 137. See Camelia Simoiu et al., The Problem of Infra-Marginality in Outcome Tests for 
Discrimination, 11 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1193, 1202–13 (2017) (employing new statistical analysis to 
expose that, as a function of suspect race, police required different thresholds of objective evidence of 
criminality to make probable cause determinations); see also Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale 
Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States (Stanford Computational Policy 
Lab, Working Paper, 2019) (observing evidence of bias against Black drivers in highway patrol and 
municipal police stops in an analysis of nearly 100 million traffic stops). 
 138. Simoiu et al., supra note 137, at 1194. 
 139. Id. at 1203 (finding relative search rates of 5.4% for Black drivers, 4.1% for Hispanic 
drivers, and 3.1% for white drivers). 
 140. Id. (finding that rate of recovery was 29% for Black drivers, 19% for Hispanic drivers, and 
32% for white drivers). 
 141. Id. at 1193. 
 142. Id. at 1207. 
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drivers.143 The observed racial disparities, it turns out, was a function of 
disparate treatment. 
The foregoing examples cohere around the insight that human judgment—
even if facially neutral and intended to be colorblind—has the potential to 
compromise even the most shallow conception of equality.144 This is not to say 
that human judgment necessarily leads to racial mismeasures but rather that the 
risk is ever present.145 
B. Uneven Conditions 
Distinct from shifting standards defects, “uneven conditions” measurement 
errors arise when an evaluative tool—or the environment in which it is 
administered—subjects certain individuals to unique burdens because of their 
race, yet fails to account for this difference.146 As a result of the uneven 
 
 143. Id. (reporting threshold level of 7% for Black drivers, 6% for Hispanic drivers, and 15% 
for white drivers). 
 144. See TONY FABELO ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., PUB. POLICY 
RESEARCH INST., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES 45 (2011), http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_Rules_Report_Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LK2-JDB3] (observing 
that even after controlling for 83 variables including socioeconomic status in analysis of over 900,000 
elementary school students, Black students remained 31% more likely than white students to be 
disciplined for discretionary violations); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 
937, 959 (2003) (“While the ratio of callbacks for nonoffenders relative to ex-offenders for whites is 
2:1, this same ratio for blacks is nearly 3:1. The effect of a criminal record is thus 40% larger for blacks 
than for whites.” (footnote omitted)); Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor 
Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 784 (2009) (reporting that in applications to 171 
employers, white applicants “received a callback or job offer 31.0 percent of the time, compared with a 
positive response rate of 25.2 percent for Latinos and 15.2 percent for blacks”); Russell J. Skiba et al., 
Unproven Links: Can Poverty Explain Ethnic Disproportionality in Special Education?, 39 J. SPECIAL 
EDUC. 130, 135–36 (2005) (reporting that in a midwestern state for the 2000–01 school year, Black 
students were more likely than other students to be identified as having a disability requiring special 
education instruction); John M. Wallace, Jr. et al., Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences in School 
Discipline Among U.S. High School Students: 1991–2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 57 (2008) 
(reporting that in a longitudinal study of school discipline, “Black boys are . . . 330% (3.3 times) more 
likely than White boys to be suspended or expelled. . . . Black girls are . . . more than five times more 
likely than White girls to be suspended or expelled.”). 
 145. Several factors—from the level of discretion to the ambiguity of behavior—tend to increase 
the likelihood of biased judgment and decisionmaking. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1096 
(“Using subsequent ratings of job performance or training performance as the criteria for measuring 
the validity of interviews, studies have shown that behavior-based, structured interviews do better than 
unstructured interviews at predicting on-the-job success.”). As a result, one could expect that shifting 
standards measurement errors are likely to be most relevant when doctrine confers decisionmakers 
with broad discretion and where the site of decision intersects with salient racial stereotypes. Consider 
police-civilian interactions, in which stereotypes about criminality are relevant and which occur under 
a Fourth Amendment regime that bestows considerable deference on law enforcement officers—per 
legal immunities and indeterminate legal standards (reasonable suspicion and probable cause). See 
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 558 (2016) (“The arguments advancing profiling ran headlong into its 
constitutional weaknesses, even under a newly capacious Fourth Amendment suspicion standard that 
invited the substitution of race-based correlates of suspicion for explicit racial categories.”). 
 146. This concern—that environments subject test takers to different conditions—differs from 
the claim that a facially neutral test contains biased content that will be more familiar to, and therefore 
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conditions, the score understates the existing talent of those subjected to the 
condition while inflating the existing talent of their unburdened counterparts. 
To appreciate how uneven conditions measurement errors operate, consider 
the following two hypotheticals. First, imagine a forty-yard sprint—a facially 
neutral evaluative tool that measures speed. As with the bathroom scale, the 
sprint could produce a race-neutral measurement error if, for instance, the track 
contains an incline (when it should be flat) or is riddled with holes (when it 
should be smooth).147 Even if a measurement error occurs, the error is race 
neutral; all runners, regardless of race, confront the relevant problematic 
conditions.148 Under an alternative scenario, the sprint could produce a 
race-dependent measurement error if, for instance, all Black runners were forced 
to run in a lane with the incline and holes, while all white runners had access to a 
flat and smooth lane. In this scenario, the track no longer provides a race-neutral 
measure of each runner’s speed. Black sprinters would receive a score that 
understates their actual ability; white runners a score that overstates theirs. 
Alternatively, imagine a law school that has identified two finalists for a 
prestigious endowed chair. Among other criteria, the school cares about 
scholarly production. To evaluate this attribute, the school measures each 
candidate’s scholarly production over the preceding three years. Over that time, 
both candidates published three articles of materially equal length and substance 
and placed the articles in journals of comparable standing. 
The evaluative tool—counting publications—is facially neutral and appears 
meritocratic, void of any measurement error. But during the time in question, 
the candidates were subject to materially different conditions. Candidate A 
taught a full course load, which consumed time and resources otherwise 
available for writing. Candidate B, in contrast, had no teaching requirements; 
nothing competed with her time for research and writing. The evaluative tool 
does not account for these different conditions. As a consequence, the tool’s 
output (three publications each) suggests equal publishing talent—that is, equal 
merit as defined by the law school. But this facial parity is illusory, the result of a 
tool that failed to account for the uneven conditions under which each candidate 
performed. Under equal conditions, one would expect Candidate A to 
outperform Candidate B. 
Under the foregoing example, the law school could promote each 
candidate’s right to compete by taking context into account. Specifically, the 
 
privilege, individuals from certain racial groups. See Erman & Walton, supra note 14, at 329 (“Where 
contexts produce stereotype threat, unmerited racial gaps can result even when test content is fair.”). 
It also differs from general (i.e., not race-specific) predictive validity critiques that advocate for 
abandoning certain measures of merit because other measures would better predict future 
performance. See West-Faulcon, supra note 113, at 1241. 
 147. See Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law School, 15 
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 73 (2013) (employing track and heckler metaphors to describe 
the phenomenon of “racial unevenness”). 
 148. To the extent runners on this track were competing against runners on level and smooth 
tracks, the uneven conditions across tracks would produce measurement errors that artificially inflated 
the relative speed of those runners on the faster track. See Erman & Walton, supra note 14, at 365. 
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school could recognize that the scores—although facially identical—signal 
different things about the candidates’ respective merit. By accounting for this 
difference, the school would promote a more individualized and meritocratic 
process that mitigates the likelihood of conferring Candidate B with an 
undeserved boost at Candidate A’s expense. 
The foregoing examples reflect how evaluative tools can compromise merit 
by failing to account for context—that is, the different conditions under which 
individuals are forced to perform. The challenge is that, in most high-stakes 
selection processes, uneven conditions measurement errors will be far less 
apparent than in the above examples. This includes settings, such as standardized 
tests, in which students from negatively stereotyped groups are subject to 
psychological headwinds such as stereotype threat.149 Stereotype threat describes 
the psychological threat an individual experiences when poor performance on a 
task would confirm a negative stereotype about a group to which she belongs.150 
Although far less visible, this psychological threat shares key characteristics with 
the hole-laden track and full course load. 
Albeit still relatively under-mined by legal scholars,151 stereotype threat 
comprises one of the most studied psychological phenomena of the past 
twenty-five years.152 The seminal stereotype threat studies,153 administered by 
Claude Steele and others, were motivated by a desire to explain an unexpected 
observation: even after controlling for incoming qualifications, Black and Latino 
college students continued to “underperform” compared to their white 
counterparts.154 In other words, even when students were similarly situated but 
 
 149. See infra notes 153–64 and accompanying text for a review of stereotype threat literature. 
 150. See Christine R. Logel et al., Unleashing Latent Ability: Implications of Stereotype Threat 
for College Admissions, 47 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 42, 42 (2012); Schmader et al., supra note 152, at 
336; Steele, A Threat in the Air, supra note 14, at 622; Claude M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of 
Black Americans, 269 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 68 (1992) [hereinafter Steele, Schooling of Black 
Americans]. 
 151. This is beginning to change. Recent publications interrogating the relationship between 
stereotype threat and constitutional doctrine include, for example, Erman & Walton, supra note 14, 
which discusses how the stereotype threat literature troubles basic presumptions about merit 
embedded in antidiscrimination regimes such as equal protection doctrine; Jonathan Feingold, Hidden 
in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case for Diversity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 59, which explores the 
relationship between stereotype threat and institutional obligations to create academic environments 
in which all students have equal access to the benefits of university membership; and Feingold, Racing 
Towards Color-Blindness, supra note 111, which draws on stereotype threat research to argue that 
common measures of academic merit—including standardized tests—systematically understate the 
existing talent of individuals from negatively stereotyped groups. 
 152. See Toni Schmader et al., An Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects on 
Performance, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 336 (2008). 
 153. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995) (observing that 
stereotype threat compromised the academic performance of African American students). 
 154. See Steele, Schooling of Black Americans, supra note 150, at 68; see also Ronald G. Fryer 
Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap in the First Two Years of 
School, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 447, 447 (2004) (“Even after controlling for a wide range of covariates 
including family structure, socioeconomic status, measures of school quality, and neighborhood 
characteristics, a substantial racial gap in test scores persists.”). Incoming qualifications similarly failed 
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for race when they entered an institution, something continued to depress the 
performance of students of color therein. This observation exposed the 
limitations of common achievement gap theories—including differing levels of 
preparation, parental levels of education, and socioeconomic status.155 
The initial studies, now reproduced across hundreds of laboratory and 
real-world settings, revealed that at least a portion of observable achievement 
gaps were attributable to stereotype threat, an invisible phenomenon that 
functions as a cognitive tax on negatively stereotyped students.156 In a recent 
overview of the stereotype threat literature, Professors Sam Erman and Gregory 
Walton explained that stereotype threat functions as an identity-contingent 
headwind that “causes performance decrements by setting in motion diverse 
deleterious social-cognitive and affective processes, including physiological stress 
responses, negative thoughts and emotions, efforts to suppress these 
psychological reactions, and consequent drains on working-memory 
efficiency.”157 
One of the most accessible summaries of the stereotype threat science came 
in two amicus briefs filed on behalf of the University of Texas in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I),158 a lawsuit concerning the University of 
Texas’s race-conscious admissions process.159 These briefs, submitted by national 
experts on stereotype threat, explained that in the context of high-stakes tests, 
such as the SAT or LSAT, stereotype threat is likely to manifest as a 
race-dependent tax.160 As a result, such tests will “often underestimate the true 
academic capacity of members of certain minority groups.”161 This 
race-dependent harm is both concrete and quantifiable.162 
 
to explain gender gaps in quantitative fields such as science and math. See Gregory M. Walton et al., 
Affirmative Meritocracy, 7 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 1, 2–3 (2013). 
 155. See Feingold, Racing Towards Color-Blindness, supra note 111, at 234–35. 
 156. See Hannah-Hanh D. Nguyen & Ann Marie Ryan, Does Stereotype Threat Affect Test 
Performance of Minorities and Women? A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Evidence, 93 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1323–26 (2008); see also Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity 
Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 82 (1999) (finding that Asian 
American women performed better on a mathematics test when their ethnic identity was activated but 
worse when their gender identity was activated); Steven J. Spencer et al., Stereotype Threat and 
Women’s Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 7 (1999) (observing the 
relationship between stereotype threat and women’s math performance). 
 157. Erman & Walton, supra note 14, at 325. 
 158. 570 U.S. 297 (2013). 
 159. See Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–
10, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) [hereinafter 
Experimental Psychologists’ Brief II]; Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 23–24, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Experimental 
Psychologists’ Brief I]. 
 160. See Experimental Psychologists’ Brief II, supra note 159, at 4. 
 161. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2234 n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Experimental Psychologists’ 
Brief II, supra 159, at 7). As I discuss in Section III, it is unclear if Justice Alito appreciated the 
Experimental Psychologists’ core claim. See Logel et al., supra note 150, at 42 (explaining that given 
stereotype threat’s prevalence across educational domains, standard measures of merit can 
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Standardized tests do not, however, account for stereotype threat.163 
Accordingly, when admissions offices treat standardized test scores as 
race-neutral measures of merit, they naturalize into the selection process illusory 
and race-dependent differences attributable to environmental contingencies, not 
actual differences in merit.164 In so doing, institutions deny students of color an 
individualized and race-free review (that is, their right to compete), while 
conferring upon their unburdened peers an unearned racial boost. 
C. Predictive Algorithms 
In addition to human judgment and standardized tests, predictive 
algorithms constitute a third facially neutral tool susceptible to race-dependent 
measurement errors. Predictive algorithms broadly capture “any well-defined 
computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input, and 
produces some value, or set of values, as output.”165 Across industries, 
decisionmakers have begun using algorithms to aid in a variety of selection 
processes.166 Given increased access to “big data,” alongside the desire for 
metrics that avoid human biases, predictive algorithms will likely continue to 
proliferate.167 
Although algorithms only recently became a fixture of institutional 
decisionmaking, scholars have already begun to interrogate how these evaluative 
tools—hailed for their ostensible neutrality and objectivity—may reproduce and 
 
“systematically underestimate the[] intellectual ability and potential” of individuals from negatively 
stereotyped groups). 
 162. See Joshua Aronson & Thomas Dee, Stereotype Threat in the Real World, in STEREOTYPE 
THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 264, 271–72 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 
2012); David S. Yeager & Gregory M. Walton, Social-Psychological Interventions in Education: 
They’re Not Magic, 81 REV. EDUC. RES. 267, 283 (2011). These studies trouble the presumption that 
absent discriminatory intent, an exam will necessarily be “administered and scored in an identical 
fashion for all applicants.” Hayden v. Cty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 163. See Rachel D. Godsil, Reaction to: Color-Blindness and Stereotyping, 3 GEO. J. L. & MOD. 
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 277, 277 (2011) (“My primary question is whether the LSAC might be a more 
suitable body to engage in the rescaling. The LSAC would seem to have the capacity to engage in a 
highly refined rescaling in which they weighed a more complex host of variables to determine whether 
the LSAT score accurately reflected the student’s capacities.”). 
 164. See Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades and Test Scores 
Systematically Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped Students, 20 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 1132, 1137 (2009). 
 165. THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 2009). 
 166. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017) 
(“The efficiency and accuracy of automated decisionmaking ensures that its domain will continue to 
expand. Even mundane activities now involve complex computerized decisions: everything from cars 
to home appliances now regularly executes computer code as part of its normal operation.”). 
 167. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 
860 (2017) (“Proponents of the new data science claim that it will not only help employers make better 
decisions faster, but that it is fairer as well because it can replace biased human decision makers with 
‘neutral’ data. However, as many scholars have pointed out, data are not neutral, and algorithms can 
discriminate.” (footnote omitted)). 
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mask bias.168 Two examples deserve mention. First, as Joshua Kroll and 
colleagues observed, “algorithms that include some type of machine learning can 
lead to discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical examples 
that reflect past prejudice or implicit bias, or on data that offer a statistically 
distorted picture of groups comprising the overall population.”169 In other words, 
if algorithms rely on criminal statistics that themselves overrepresent particular 
groups because of racially selective policing, that bias will be reproduced in the 
algorithm’s outputs.170 
“Second, machine learning models can build in discrimination through 
choices in how models are constructed.”171 Often, an algorithm must be taught—
by humans—how to interpret the data it encounters.172 Imagine an algorithm 
that predicts a student’s academic ability by looking to prior students’ incoming 
qualifications and academic performance within the university. These data may 
reveal that certain students, as a function of race, over- or underperform relative 
to their incoming qualifications. The algorithm has to determine how to interpret 
those deltas. 
Commonsense assumptions would explain any racial disparities vis-à-vis 
academic performance as reflecting actual group-based differences in terms of 
existing talent, preparation, and motivation. But such narratives fail to account 
for environmental forces that subject students to different conditions as a 
function of identity. When one accounts for context, it reveals that the observed 
gap—or at least a portion thereof—is illusory; rather than evidencing different 
abilities, it reflects different conditions. 
D. Neither Intentional Disparate Treatment nor Disparate Impact 
As described above, various facially neutral evaluative tools are susceptible 
to race-dependent measurement errors that mismeasure an individual’s existing 
talent and abilities. As a result, when decisionmakers unmindfully rely on such 
metrics and imbue a selection process with racial mismeasures, they compromise 
 
 168. See Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349, 415 (2017) (citing 
emerging scholarship on the relationship between algorithms and racial bias). 
 169. Kroll et al., supra note 166, at 680; see also Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s 
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 708 (2016) (“Models trained on biased samples and 
mislabeled examples, on the other hand, will result in correspondingly skewed assessments rather than 
reflect real-world disparities.”). 
 170. See Kroll et al., supra note 166, at 681 (discussing the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, 
which disproportionately targeted Black and Latino young men); see also Floyd v. City of New York, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The NYPD has directed officers to target young black and 
Hispanic men because these groups are heavily represented in criminal suspect data—the reliability of 
which is questionable—in those areas where the NYPD carries out most of its stops.”) Notably, white 
men stopped during the NYPD’s program were, in fact, more likely to be carrying weapons or 
contraband than either Black or Latino men. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. at 559. 
 171. Kroll et al., supra note 166, at 681. 
 172. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 169, at 678 (“[D]ata miners must translate some 
amorphous problem into a question that can be expressed in more formal terms that computers can 
parse. . . . Through this necessarily subjective process of translation, data miners may unintentionally 
parse the problem in such a way that happens to systematically disadvantage protected classes.”). 
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the principle of the right to compete.173 This result should trouble Supreme 
Court Justices who place a premium on individual meritocracy. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that racial mismeasures, even as they 
undermine the Supreme Court’s stated commitment to a right to compete, do 
not necessarily constitute intentional discrimination nor produce a racially 
disparate impact. To appreciate how this is so, consider the following 
hypothetical. 
Imagine that a government employer prohibits dreadlocks.174 This policy 
would predictably produce a racially disparate impact because Black candidates 
are more likely to have dreadlocks than candidates of other races.175 If the 
employer adopted the policy because of its racial impact, that would constitute 
intentional discrimination.176 But assume the employer adopted the policy in 
spite of its disparate impact. There is no intentional discrimination concern. 
Moreover, so long as the employer accurately identifies who does and does not 
have dreadlocks, the policy would not implicate a candidate’s right to compete. 
At the moment of decision, the presence or absence of dreadlocks—which 
constitutes merit in this scenario—determines whether a candidate advances in 
the hiring process, irrespective of the candidate’s race. 
Now imagine the employer utilizes fancy facial recognition software to 
determine which candidates have dreadlocks. The program scans headshots of 
each applicant. Individuals with dreadlocks are screened out; those without 
dreadlocks advance. We have a facially neutral evaluative tool that continues to 
produce a disparate impact, but there is still no right-to-compete concern. But 
now imagine the program misidentifies some percentage of Black candidates 
(say, 10%) as having dreadlocks when they do not, and it therefore screens them 
 
 173. Racial mismeasures can be understood as evaluative tools in which “status causation” is 
baked into the machine itself. See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2017) (“This injury of ‘status causation’ arises when . . . an individual 
suffers . . . harm ‘because of such individual’s race . . . .’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018))). 
 174. This hypothetical is rooted in reality. In EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Services, 852 
F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016), the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII’s prohibition of race discrimination 
did not extend to an employer’s anti-dreadlock policy. Catastrophe Mgmt. Servs., 852 F.3d at 1021. 
 175. This is not to say that only Black candidates would be affected, just that Black candidates, 
as a group, would likely be more impacted than other racial groups. Moreover, the policy could have 
an intersectional impact if, for instance, Black women are more likely to wear their hair in dreadlocks 
than Black men (or vice versa). 
 176. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). There are at least three broad 
categories of state action that constitute intentional discrimination: (1) racial classifications, see Gratz 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253 (2003) (involving an admissions policy that expressly classified students 
on a racial basis); (2) facially neutral laws intentionally applied in a discriminatory manner, see Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (involving the racially disparate administration of a facially 
neutral law); and (3) facially neutral policies adopted because of their racially disparate impact, see 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (involving a facially 
neutral policy that produced a racially disparate impact). These latter two categories are often 
understood as “covert intentional discrimination.” See Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but 
Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 
657–59 (2015). 
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out when it should not. Only Black candidates, some not all, take this hit; the 
program accurately identifies dreadlocks on all other races. 
The facially neutral hiring process has now been corrupted by a race-based 
measurement error. The tool—an algorithm—contains a shifting standards 
defect. Whatever the cause—perhaps the programmers conflated braids with 
dreadlocks—the program systematically misreads headshots on a racial basis. 
Certain Black candidates with the same performance (no dreadlocks) as 
similarly situated competitors are nonetheless evaluated differently. In so doing, 
the process harms individuals who possess the requisite merit to advance in the 
hiring process; other candidates receive a commensurate boost because they do 
not have to compete against all candidates who should have advanced. 
This process defect captures the paradigmatic harm of racial mismeasures 
and contravenes each candidate’s interest in a right to compete. As noted above, 
this deviation from neutrality is not intentional. Moreover, even if the policy 
(marred by this defect) does not produce a racially disparate impact in terms of 
ultimate hires, it still undermines the ability of certain candidates to compete on 
the basis of their individual merit, irrespective of their race.177 
This reveals that certain policies will contain racial mismeasures concerns 
even if they do not produce a disparate impact. The reverse is also true: many 
policies likely to have a disparate impact will not necessarily implicate racial 
mismeasures concerns.178 This would include, for instance, the catalog of “tax, 
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes” identified in Davis.179 
Many, if not all, will likely produce a disparate impact. Yet few, if any, 
necessarily involve selection processes that rely on racial mismeasures.180 
 
 177. In this sense, the distinctions between disparate impact and racial mismeasures follow a 
familiar track—that which the Court’s conservatives have used to distinguish disparate impact from 
disparate treatment. Disparate impact, as a theory of discrimination, focuses on the group and 
outcomes. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260 (observing that a veterans’ preference statute, although 
gender-neutral, had disparate impact on women relative to men). Disparate treatment, in contrast, 
focuses on individuals and opportunity. Zatz, supra note 173, at 1371 (“Generally speaking, a disparate 
treatment claim arises whenever an employer makes a decision based on an individual’s protected 
status.”).  
 178. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“[C]laims that stress 
‘disparate impact’ . . . involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by 
business necessity.”). 
 179. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 & n.14 (1976) (“[Scholarship] suggests that 
disproportionate-impact analysis might invalidate ‘tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferment, 
public employment, jury service, and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities . . . ; 
[s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, and other state-imposed charges.’ It 
has also been argued that minimum wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing requirements 
would require major modifications in light of the unequal-impact rule.” (omission in original) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 300 (1972))). 
 180. Such policies, and the racial disparities they produce, reflect actual group-based differences 
that are the product of “societal discrimination.” The Supreme Court has deemed “societal 
discrimination” insufficient to justify racial classifications. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (“But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against 
innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over expansive.”); Regents of Univ. of 
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Disparate impact theory often elevates distinct mismeasurement concerns 
understood in terms of a metric’s job-relatedness.181 Unlike racial mismeasures—
which focus on deficiencies in the underlying measurement instrument—
job-relatedness concerns are predicated on the notion that the measured 
attribute (even if accurately measured) is a poor proxy of merit in the given 
context. This concern comes through in Justice Burger’s explication of Title VII 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,182 one of the most well-known disparate impact 
decisions: 
 Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring 
procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is 
giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are 
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Congress has 
not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better 
qualified simply because of minority origins. . . . What Congress has 
commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job 
and not the person in the abstract.183 
Justice Burger noted that testing has its place in employment decisions and 
that even under Title VII’s disparate impact provision, Congress did not require 
employers to employ the less qualified over the more qualified.184 Rather, the 
mandate is that employers rely on metrics related to the underlying job—a 
concern about job-relatedness, not measurement accuracy. Note that implicit in 
Justice Burger’s statement is faith in the racial neutrality of facially neutral tests. 
The racial mismeasures concern does not even appear to have pierced the 
Justice’s imagination. 
III. THE CASE FOR REDESIGNING DOCTRINE 
As empirical methods and technologies improve, we will continue to learn 
about the severity and pervasiveness of racial mismeasures. Even now, existing 
empirical findings disrupt the assumption that facially neutral evaluative tools 
produce racially neutral results. 
This raises difficult questions for equal protection doctrine, which remains 
predicated on the fragile presumption that facially neutral selection processes 
offer a seamless route to even the most basic conception of individual 
meritocracy. By inoculating facially neutral state action from meaningful judicial 
review, existing doctrine incentivizes conduct that produces the very harm that a 
 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 n.36 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“No one denies the regrettable fact 
that there has been societal discrimination in this country against various racial and ethnic groups.”). 
 181. Even if one accepts the SAT as a valid metric for college admissions, few would view an 
SAT score as relevant to a person’s qualifications to become a line cook. 
 182. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 183. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. Stephen M. Rich explained that Griggs “presented a situation in 
which all workers were subjected to the same treatment regardless of race, but a facially neutral 
practice produced a discriminatory outcome because of externalities concerning the historically 
subordinated social position of African Americans for which the plaintiff workers were not themselves 
responsible.” Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 50 (2011). 
 184. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
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majority of Justices believe the Equal Protection Clause was designed to 
prevent. Equally troublesome, by rendering racial classifications presumptively 
unconstitutional, the doctrine disincentivizes decisionmakers from taking 
race-conscious steps to mitigate the harms derivative of race-based measurement 
errors.185 
In this final section, I explore how equal protection doctrine—assuming it is 
designed to promote the right to compete—should respond to the science. To 
begin, it invites a serious and critical assessment of the rigid divide between 
facially neutral state action and racial classifications. Doctrinal reform need not 
entail a complete overhaul of existing doctrine. Still, an equal protection doctrine 
designed to promote the right to compete warrants two targeted tweaks. 
First, in the context of equal protection claims targeting facially neutral 
state action, one responsive doctrinal reform would be to eliminate the 
discriminatory intent standard in the context of selection processes that produce 
a racially disparate impact and rely on racial mismeasures. Second, in the context 
of racial classifications, the Supreme Court should recognize as a compelling 
interest race-conscious measures designed to ameliorate race-dependent 
measurement errors laden in the underlying selection process. Were the 
Supreme Court to adopt the foregoing approach, it would incentivize state actors 
to reduce their reliance on, and correct for, faulty metrics that compromise basic 
commitments to racial neutrality and individual meritocracy. 
From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the appeal of this shift is 
twofold. First, it better positions doctrine to promote a central normative 
foundation of modern equal protection doctrine. Second, an equal protection 
doctrine attentive to racial mismeasures would not trigger the manageability 
concerns that have animated anxieties surrounding disparate impact theory.186 
For instance, in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court expressed concern that 
disparate impact theory “would be far reaching and would raise serious 
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public 
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the 
poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.”187 As noted 
above, a theory of discrimination predicated on racial mismeasures is not 
coterminous with disparate impact. Thus, equal protection doctrine could better 
 
 185. Given doctrine’s hostility to racial classifications, which will often be necessary to mitigate 
the equality harms derivative of racial mismeasures, the opposite may in fact be true. Cf. Rich, supra 
note 183, at 87 (“Disparate treatment theory should play an important role in shaping employers’ 
compliance strategies, including diversity initiatives, in order to better fulfill antidiscrimination law’s 
goal of promoting equal employment opportunity.”). 
 186. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (noting that a disparate impact standard 
of liability would render constitutionally infirm a set of existing governmental policies); see also 
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (“The acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theory 
would render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial 
motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be.”); Paul Brest, Foreword: In 
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1976) (discussing the “judicial 
unmanageability of a general rule requiring an extraordinary justification for practices that produce 
racially disproportionate effects”). 
 187. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
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respond to racial mismeasures without rendering the foregoing list of 
government action constitutionally insecure. 
Rendering doctrine more responsive to racial mismeasures would also serve 
distinct separation of powers considerations. In Croson, Justice O’Connor 
suggested that the “Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . desired to place 
clear limits on the States’ use of race as a criterion for legislative action, and to 
have the federal courts enforce those limitations.”188 Although O’Connor’s 
comments arose in the context of a racial classification, there is little reason to 
think that the underlying sentiment would not extend to other state action that 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s personal equality guarantees.189 
This could include, for instance, when the government relies on racial 
mismeasures to allocate public benefits and burdens. One could argue that any 
abstract commitment to a robust separation of powers is heightened in the 
context of racial mismeasures, which will predictably benefit racial majorities 
that hold political, economic, and social power.190 A doctrinal framework that 
precludes meaningful judicial intervention will accordingly fall most heavily on 
individuals who belong to groups that depend most on the courts to enforce 
formal equality rights.191 In contrast, a doctrine attentive to racial mismeasures 
would serve the critical purpose of re-empowering the judiciary to intervene on 
behalf of those who lack the power to remedy constitutional violations through 
the political branches or other extrajudicial processes. 
A. Reimagined Doctrine: The Case Studies 
To appreciate the impact of this doctrinal shift, I offer two short case 
studies, each of which revisits a well-known equal protection decision by 
reimagining the case through a racial mismeasures lens. 
 
 188. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490–91 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see id. at 490 (“Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state 
power, and the States must undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that provision. To hold 
otherwise would be to cede control over the content of the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 state 
legislatures and their myriad political subdivisions. The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory 
purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentially entitle the States to exercise the full 
power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from 
judicial scrutiny under § 1.”). 
 189. Even under an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is little reason to 
believe that the Framers viewed racial classifications as constitutionally suspect. See Jed Rubenfeld, 
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427, 430–32 (1997) (explaining that the Congress responsible 
for the Fourteenth Amendment “repeatedly enacted statutes allocating special benefits to blacks on 
the express basis of race”). 
 190. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 58 (3d ed. 2015) (outlining the accumulation of racial wealth gaps in the United States). 
 191. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
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1. Reimagining Washington v. Davis 
In Washington v. Davis, African American police officers challenged the 
constitutionality of Test 21, an employment test that the District of Columbia 
used to make promotion determinations.192 The District’s reliance on Test 21 
produced a racially disparate impact, which the plaintiffs claimed violated their 
equal protection rights.193 Consistent with this framing, much of the litigation 
centered on Test 21’s job-relatedness.194 The Supreme Court ultimately 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that disparate impact alone did not 
establish a constitutionally cognizable claim.195 
But suppose the parties possessed evidence that Test 21 systematically 
underestimated the verbal skills of African American test takers196 and that the 
District made no attempt to account for this race-dependent measurement error. 
Under such facts, the relevant equality concern is no longer only one of disparate 
impact at the level of the group. Rather, it also presents a paradigmatic racial 
mismeasures concern: the present and personal harm that arises when the 
government denies each applicant the opportunity to compete as an individual, 
 
 192. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1976). 
 193. Id. at 233, 236. 
 194. See id. at 245 (“As an initial matter, we have difficulty understanding how a law 
establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and 
denies ‘any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply because a greater proportion of Negroes 
fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.” (omission in original)); Brief for 
Petitioner at *1, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (No. 74-1492), 1975 WL 173557 (“Questions 
Presented[:] 1. Whether the undisputed statistical data of record conclusively establishes the absence 
of an adverse racial impact in the Metropolitan Police Department’s selection procedures and thus 
renders unnecessary a demonstration by the Department that its entrance test is job related. 
2. Whether the Department’s entrance test is demonstrably a rational measure of the verbal ability a 
police applicant must have to be trained in the Department’s recruit school and, as such, is job related 
under established fair employment criteria.”); Brief for Respondent at *1, Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976) (No. 74-1492), 1975 WL 173558 (“Questions Presented[:] 1. Whether Test 21, 
administered by the District of Columbia Police Department to applicants for employment, has a 
substantial adverse impact on blacks? 2. Whether the Police Department has shown any legitimate 
justification for its use of Test 21?”). 
 195. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39 (“This is not the constitutional rule. We have never held that the 
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the 
standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.”). Even had the Court accepted 
disparate impact theory, there is no guarantee that the plaintiffs would have prevailed. To the 
contrary, the majority appeared receptive to the government’s desire to “modestly . . . upgrade the 
communicative abilities of its employees.” See id. at 245–46 (“Test 21 . . . concededly seeks to ascertain 
whether those who take it have acquired a particular level of verbal skill; and it is untenable that the 
Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities 
of its employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where 
the job requires special ability to communicate orally and in writing.”). 
 196. The requisite evidentiary standard could track that employed in systemic disparate 
treatment claims. Cf. Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 506–07 (2011) (contrasting testimony that “condemns all 
subjective decision making, and would apply to virtually any employer that relies on subjective 
assessments as part of its employment practices” and testimony that offers particular evidence “about 
the company’s actual practices and explain[s] why those practices should be seen as influenced by 
gender stereotypes”). 
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on their own merit, irrespective of race.197 This harm remains even if all parties 
concur that Test 21 measures a job-related attribute.198 
Imagine further that the District knows that Test 21 produces 
race-dependent measurement errors but argues that the plaintiffs lack standing 
because they cannot establish that they would have been hired but for the 
mismeasurement. The District’s descriptive portrayal of the evidence is likely 
accurate, at least for some candidates. Moreover, even if existing research 
methods reveal that Test 21, on average, underestimates the talent of African 
American candidates, the plaintiffs likely would be unable to determine the 
degree to which any particular candidate has suffered.199 
Assuming the plaintiffs are seeking prospective relief, the inability to 
establish direct causation between the measurement error and any individual 
plaintiff’s rejection should not doom their claim. To begin, even if probabilistic, 
the harm is concrete and quantifiable.200 Moreover, the plaintiffs could trade on 
case law that has recognized a constitutional injury in the mere existence of a 
selection process that denies every candidate the ability to compete on the basis 
of individual merit, irrespective of race.201 Whether race played a role in their 
particular case is of no importance.202 
 
 197. Imagine further that the plaintiffs allege that the government’s choice to rely on racial 
mismeasures, which will only harm Black people, stigmatizes Black candidates—who are marked with 
a badge of inferiority in the eyes of the state. 
 198. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 (“[P]roof that more Negroes than whites had been disqualified 
by Test 21 . . . would, alone, not demonstrate that respondents individually were being denied equal 
protection of the laws by the application of an otherwise valid qualifying test . . . . Nor on the facts of 
the case before us would the disproportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion that it is a 
purposeful device to discriminate against Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional 
rights of respondents as well as other black applicants.”). 
 199. Cf. Erman & Walton, supra note 14, at 348 (“Individuals vary in their experience of 
stereotype threat, both because of individual differences in susceptibility to the same threat-inducing 
cues (two students in the same standardized testing environment may experience different levels of 
threat) and because of differences in the cues people are exposed to (students may attend different 
high schools that vary in their level of threat). If threat reduces black students’ scores on a test by an 
average of twenty-five points, it will reduce the scores of some black students by more than twenty-five 
points and others by less.”). 
 200. See Kang & Lane, supra note 112, at 520 (“Now, the convenient story is also being 
contested with something more—the modern authority of empirical evidence from the mind sciences. 
We now have accumulated hard data, collected from scientific experiments, with all their 
mathematical precisions, objective measurements, and statistical dissections—for better and worse. 
The data force us to see through the facile assumptions of colorblindness.”). 
 201. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville 
(Northeastern Florida), 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“When the government erects a barrier that makes it 
more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a 
member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have 
obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal 
protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the 
barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”). 
 202. See id. at 665 (“[In Bakke,] Justice Powell concluded that the ‘constitutional requirements 
of Art. III’ had been satisfied, because the requisite ‘injury’ was the medical school’s ‘decision not to 
permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race.’ Thus, ‘even if 
Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special 
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Lastly, challenging the use of a racial mismeasure would align with the 
Supreme Court’s hostility to racial classifications that consider race as part of a 
holistic assessment of each candidate.203 Given the nature of such policies, it is 
often difficult—if not impossible—to determine the precise degree to which a 
university considered a given applicant’s race. Yet the Court has never cited this 
imprecision as precluding a plaintiff from establishing constitutional standing or 
causation.204 And while it is true that the Supreme Court is more receptive to 
policies that consider race in a holistic fashion, such policies remain 
constitutionally suspect; plaintiffs need only show that the defendant considers 
race to establish constitutional standing.205 Thus, the probabilistic and imprecise 
nature of racial mismeasures should not, consistent with prevailing doctrine, 
undermine our hypothetical plaintiffs’ ability to bring a cognizable equal 
protection challenge against Test 21. 
2. Reimagining Gratz v. Bollinger 
In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court struck down the University of 
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy, which automatically awarded a 
fixed number of points to applicants from “an underrepresented racial or ethnic 
minority group.”206 Although it was not the case, one could reimagine Gratz as a 
case in which the University of Michigan employed racial classifications to 
mitigate race-based measurement errors embedded in the SAT. Michigan did 
not make this argument. But imagine if it had. 
What if, armed with decades of social science demonstrating that 
standardized tests systemically underestimate the actual talent of students from 
negatively stereotyped groups, Michigan explained that it considered an 
applicant’s race in order to account for measurement defects in the SAT.207 
Michigan could then explain that failure to do so would naturalize into its 
admissions process racial mismeasures that confer a racial preference upon white 
 
program, it would not follow that he lacked standing.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280–81 n.14 (1978) (plurality opinion))). 
 203. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to an 
admissions policy that permitted admissions officers to consider an applicant’s race as one factor in a 
holistic review), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to an admissions 
policy that assigned points on the basis of an applicant’s race). 
 204. See Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 666. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255, 275–76. 
 207. The nation’s leading stereotype threat experts made this very argument in Fisher II. See 
Experimental Psychologists’ Brief II, supra note 159, at 4 (“It is the view of amici that admissions that 
are allowed to consider every factor except race not only undermine diversity goals but also 
mismeasure the true merits of minority candidates.”); see also Selmi, Testing for Equality, supra note 
113, at 1314 (“Rather than assuming that affirmative action is inefficient and antimeritocratic, we can 
see by exploring the underlying assumptions how affirmative action may be a rational response to the 
persistence of discrimination . . . .”). Michigan would not be claiming that the SAT is, as a general 
matter, a poor proxy for merit. Though maybe it should be. See Michelle Richardson et al., 
Psychological Correlates of University Students’ Academic Performance: A Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 353, 354 (2012) (explaining that “high school GPA is a stronger 
predictor of university GPA than is either the SAT or the ACT”). 
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applicants unburdened by stereotype threat.208 In other words, Michigan could 
have argued that it considered applicant race in order to avoid—or at least 
combat—the “principal evil” that Justice Powell identified in Bakke: a review 
process that denies each student an individualized assessment of their existing 
merit, irrespective of race.209 
In fact, Michigan could point to a different—and often overlooked—portion 
of Justice Powell’s opinion, in which he observed that “[r]acial classifications in 
admissions conceivably could serve a fifth purpose . . . : fair appraisal of each 
individual’s academic promise in the light of some cultural bias in grading or 
testing procedures.”210 Justice Powell explained that “[t]o the extent that race 
and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of curing established 
inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is 
no ‘preference’ at all.”211 Consistent with Justice Powell’s observation, when a 
decisionmaker considers race to eliminate preferences embedded in the status 
quo, the equality harm so often associated with racial classifications is exposed as 
illusory.212 Rather than constituting a deviation from neutrality, the racial 
classification is necessary to move closer toward a selection process that turns on 
individual merit, irrespective of one’s race. 
 
 208. See Experimental Psychologists’ Brief II, supra note 159, at 5 (“A genuine merit-based 
admission policy therefore cannot rely on these numbers alone. An admissions policy that takes 
proper account of stereotype threat is not a departure from merit-based admissions, but is rather an 
effort to achieve more accurate merit-based admissions.”); Feingold, Racing Towards Color-Blindness, 
supra note 111, at 259–60. 
 209. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(“The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his race is 
the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions program.”). 
 210. Id. at 306 n.43. 
 211. Id. Although beyond the scope of this Article, Justice Powell’s observation begs the 
question of whether strict scrutiny should apply to racial classifications designed to mitigate race-based 
mismeasurements. Cf. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: 
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 280 (1994) (“If the SAT is biased against 
blacks, it will underpredict their college performance. . . . It would be as if the test underestimated the 
‘true’ SAT score of the blacks, so the natural remedy for this kind of bias would be to compensate the 
black applicants by, for example, adding the appropriate number of points onto their scores.”); Erman 
& Walton, supra note 14, at 378 (discussing the possibility of recalibrating test scores based on race); 
Paul R. Sackett & Steffanie L. Wilk, Within-Group Norming and Other Forms of Score Adjustment in 
Preemployment Testing, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 929, 933 (1994) (calling “score adjustment[s]” “a 
technically appropriate solution” in response to a finding of latent ability). 
 212. In a sense, race-conscious policies designed to reduce racial preferences in the present are 
arguably more compelling than those designed to remedy an entity’s prior discrimination—which itself 
remains the least controversial justification for racial classifications. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 328 (2003) (“It is true that some language in those opinions [decided since Bakke] might be read 
to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based 
governmental action.”). 
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B. Engaging Predictable Objections 
1. Judicial Incompetence 
When confronted by the foregoing social science, one can expect several 
objections. First, as reflected in Justice Alito’s dissent in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin (Fisher II),213 individual Justices may claim that they are 
incompetent to evaluate the underlying data.214 Fisher II involved the University 
of Texas’s (UT) admissions program, which engaged in a holistic review 
(including race) of a subset of applicants.215 In a 4-3 decision authored by Justice 
Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that UT’s consideration of race satisfied 
constitutional requirements.216 In dissent, Justice Alito suggested that it was 
“more than a little ironic that UT uses the SAT, which has often been accused of 
reflecting racial and cultural bias.”217 Yet, in so stating, Justice Alito did not 
question whether UT’s reliance on the SAT compromised commitments to 
meritocracy, nor did he otherwise engage the underlying social science on the 
merits. Instead, he sidestepped the claim’s substance by suggesting that even if 
the SAT were racially biased, he was “ill equipped to express a view on that 
subject.”218 
It may seem odd for a Justice to publicly question his or her own 
competence to interrogate and evaluate social science. The Supreme Court has 
an extended history of mobilizing science to inform questions of constitutional 
equality. Brown v. Board of Education219 offers one notable example.220 This is 
not to suggest that the Supreme Court, or individual Justices, always exhibit a 
principled or consistent engagement with social science.221 Nonetheless, Justices 
across the ideological spectrum have invoked, and continue to invoke, social 
science to dispute and champion contested empirical positions.222 
 
 213. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 214. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2234 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 2205–07 (majority opinion). 
 216. Id. at 2214–15. 
 217. Id. at 2234 & n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the stereotype threat brief discussed 
above is among the scholarship that Justice Alito offers to ground this point. See id. at 2234 n.11. 
 218. Id. at 2234. 
 219. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 220. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.11 (citing psychological studies to support the contention 
that segregated schooling harmed Black children). 
 221. See generally Feingold & Carter, supra note 74 (exploring the Court’s inconsistent 
treatment of social science and empirical evidence of discrimination in the equal protection context). 
 222. Compare Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 331–33 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (invoking research 
to suggest that affirmative action harms its beneficiaries who become “mismatch[ed]” at elite 
institutions), with Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212 (citing quantitative and qualitative evidence that racial 
diversity has pedagogical benefits), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (invoking amici 
briefs describing research on the pedagogical benefits of racial diversity), and Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273–74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Job applicants with identical 
resumés, qualifications, and interview styles still experience different receptions, depending on their 
race. White and African-American consumers still encounter different deals. People of color looking 
for housing still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders. 
2019] EQUAL PROTECTION DESIGN DEFECTS 551 
Given this backdrop, Justice Alito’s comment in Fisher II appears out of 
place. Moreover, notwithstanding this selective avoidance, Justice Alito invoked 
multiple empirical claims within the same opinion that reflect precisely the sort 
of literacy he discounts.223 If Justice Alito is ill equipped to express a view about 
social science that reveals bias within facially neutral metrics, it is difficult to 
identify the source of his authority to propound other empirical opinions and 
objections concerning the neutrality and unbiased nature of standardized tests 
such as the SAT. 
In short, any claim of judicial incompetence proves too much. Although 
often unstated, equal protection doctrine is anchored to a constellation of 
empirical assumptions about the descriptive state of the world. To abdicate 
judicial authority to evaluate empirical claims that contravene lay theories 
embedded in doctrine is not a neutral or impartial act; but rather one that 
privileges a status quo that may itself lack any principled empirical foundation. 
2. Scientific Shortcomings 
A separate objection is that the science is itself uncompelling, a claim that 
could occur at two levels of analysis. Broadly, the Supreme Court could reject 
social science’s observations that racial mismeasures exist and predictably 
disfavor individuals from negatively stereotyped groups. The narrower objection 
is that, even if the science is valid and compelling, the science and technology is 
insufficient to establish a cognizable discrimination claim for an individual 
plaintiff. 
Multiple factors mute the force of an objection to the social science 
generally. To begin, even the Supreme Court’s most conservative Justices have 
recognized the existence of conscious and unconscious racial biases. 
McCleskey v. Kemp224 offers a compelling illustration. In McCleskey, the Court 
confronted empirical evidence that Georgia’s capital punishment regime 
discriminated against Black defendants.225 A conservative majority rejected 
Warren McCleskey’s constitutional claim, but not because the evidence was 
insufficient to establish systemic disparate treatment.226 To the contrary, Justice 
Scalia’s conference memorandum revealed no misgivings regarding the 
prevalence of racial bias: “[I]t is my view that the unconscious operation of 
irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and 
(hence) prosecutorial [ones], is real, acknowledged [by the cases] of this court, 
 
Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are the low bidders, and they are 
sometimes refused work even after winning contracts. Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting 
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal 
opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 223. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216–19, 2226–30 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 224. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 225. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–91 (reviewing the Baldus study, which examined “over 
2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970’s”). 
 226. See id. at 292–99. 
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and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof.”227 This 
disconcerting statement reveals that, at least for Justice Scalia, the descriptive 
reality of implicit bias and its impact on human judgment was a given.228 
The state of the science buttresses Justice Scalia’s personal account. Support 
can be found in competing meta-analyses that analyzed the correlation between 
implicit bias and discriminatory behavior. A meta-analysis authored by the 
creators of the Implicit Association Test found that implicit bias is systemic and 
predictably leads to discriminatory treatment in socially sensitive domains.229 
Coming from the IAT’s creators, one might be wary of such results. As such, an 
even stronger case for implicit bias’s real world impact arguably comes from an 
unexpected source: a meta-analysis authored by experts commonly hired to 
contest the impact of implicit bias.230 This competing study also observed a 
correlation between bias and behavior.231 
Stereotype threat, moreover, comprises one of the most widely studied 
psychological phenomena of the past thirty years.232 Meta-analyses and hundreds 
of laboratory and real-world studies have documented stereotype threat’s 
widespread impact.233 Support for stereotype threat also comes from an unlikely 
source: scholars from the team that authored the anti-implicit-bias meta-analysis. 
Specifically, Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock have both invoked the 
stereotype threat research to support their critique of implicit bias.234 Ultimately, 
even if the science of racial mismeasures has not reached “metaphysical 
certitude,” it offers demonstrably more than the evidence—or lack thereof—that 
underlies multiple empirical assumptions that continue to govern constitutional 
doctrine.235 
 
 227. Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to the Conference (Jan. 6, 1987) (on file with 
the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers). 
 228. See id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“It 
is well documented that conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, 
remain alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest values and ideals.”). 
 229. See Greenwald et al., Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, supra note 124, at 24 (observing 
average predictive validity correlation of r = .236 on racially discriminatory behavior); see also John T. 
Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and 
Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 
RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39 (2009) (responding to critiques of the research on implicit bias). 
 230. See Oswald et al., supra note 125, at 171, 178 (observing estimated population correlation 
of 0.15 for the “race domain”). 
 231. See Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact, supra note 119, at 631. 
 232. See Schmader et al., supra note 152, at 336 (“Stereotype threat has become one of the most 
widely studied topics of the past decade in social psychology.”). 
 233. See supra Part II.B. 
 234. See Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1119 & n.298 (2006) (“[M]aking African American participants 
vulnerable to judgment by negative stereotypes about their group’s intellectual ability depressed their 
standardized test performance relative to White participants, while conditions designed to alleviate 
this threat, improved their performance.” (alteration in original) (quoting Steele & Aronson, supra 
note 153, at 808)). 
 235. See Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact, supra note 119, at 634–35 (“[S]kepticism should be 
even-handed. It should not be naïvely and selectively trotted out against politically inconvenient 
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But even if Supreme Court Justices accept racial mismeasures as a 
generalizable phenomenon, they may nonetheless challenge the relevance of 
such evidence to an individual plaintiff’s discrimination claim. Such a move—
accepting the social science but minimizing its doctrinal relevance—would 
parallel McCleskey, in which a conservative majority deemed evidence of 
systemic discrimination constitutionally irrelevant.236 Notwithstanding 
McCleskey, a selection process that employs racial mismeasures contravenes a 
commitment to every individual’s right to compete. Moreover, constitutional 
precedent spanning Bakke to Croson and Lesage to Fisher II identifies a 
constitutional harm in the presence of a selection process that compromises this 
commitment, whether or not the plaintiff would have realized the desired benefit 
in its absence. 
CONCLUSION 
If one takes the science seriously, it becomes apparent that equal protection 
doctrine incentivizes the government to adopt decisionmaking processes that will 
contravene the right to compete. Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe the 
Supreme Court, particularly its conservative members, will do anything about it. 
If this proves accurate, and the Supreme Court ignores evidence that equal 
protection doctrine undermines the normative values it is ostensibly designed to 
uplift, one is forced to ask what is actually driving the Supreme Court’s 
adjudication of equal protection cases. 
If not the right to compete, then what? At a minimum, ongoing judicial 
indifference to the science of racial mismeasures suggests that the Supreme 
Court’s commitment to individual meritocracy is more conditional and 
contingent than the Justices would suggest. Thus, even were one to accept the 
right to compete as a genuine normative commitment, it is difficult to ignore that 
the Supreme Court’s once uncompromising commitment to this principle has 
eroded as the principle no longer justifies prevailing doctrinal arrangements. 
Taken one step further, one may ask whether individual meritocracy has 
historically functioned not as an end to realize but rather as a means to justify 
and rationalize a doctrinal regime that foreseeably reproduces and reaffirms 
racial hierarchy and inequality in the United States. 
 
findings and not against, for example, the psychological ‘common sense’ assumptions littered 
throughout the status quo, most of which have never been empirically tested. . . . [I]f we demand 
metaphysical certitude of one set of empirical claims, we should demand the same certitude of all 
comparable empirical claims.” (footnote omitted)). 
 236. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (“The unique nature of the decisions at 
issue in this case also counsels against adopting such an inference from the disparities indicated by the 
Baldus study. Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an inference 
that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”). 
